tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1590982185559588522024-02-21T02:45:23.799-08:00Science, Philosophy, and GodMiles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-7286978211670018632013-10-25T20:29:00.000-07:002013-10-26T06:22:28.926-07:00Critique Of The Kalam Cosmological Argument<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By Jason Barr</span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I. Introduction</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">In this article, I will be presenting a critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">God made famous as of late by philosopher William Lane Craig. I believe that even though the argument </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">is logically valid, there are insufficient reasons for believing the premises are actually true.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">II. Preliminary Definitions</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By “cause”, my opponent means that which brings an effect into being. However, this seems extremely </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">vague to me. Instead of using the terminology of Aristotle, I would prefer to break up conditions for a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">thing existing into two categories:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">i) Necessary Condition(s)<br />ii) Sufficient Condition(s)</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A necessary condition is a condition that can exist without its effect being a direct result, but the </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">necessary condition has to exist for the effect to exist. A sufficient condition is a condition that cannot </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">exist without its effect being a direct result. When we say something is “caused”, we as human beings </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">mean this to be a sufficient cause. For example, if a ripple on a pond begins to exist, we wouldn’t say the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">pond caused it if someone asked, we would say the wind, or the rock being skipped caused it. Just </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">because the ripple couldn’t occur without the pond, and it could be considered a necessary cause </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">assuming a sufficient cause, most people would think of the cause as being the sufficient condition, or </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">conditions. Now, imagine that a ripple occurred in a pond spontaneously with no sufficient conditions to </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">bring the ripple into being, it would be reasonable to call this an uncaused event, even though the ripple </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">couldn’t exist without the pond (nobody would shrug the event off like it was still caused, just because </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the ripple wouldn’t exist without the pond). To clarify, something is caused if both necessary and </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">sufficient conditions are present. If something happened spontaneously, but still had dependence on a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">necessary condition; that would still be an uncaused event. For these reasons I reject the notion that if </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">something is uncaused, that means it came from nothing. In the scenario mentioned above, the ripple is </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">uncaused even though it came from the pond and had necessary conditions. Thus, it seems that both </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">necessary and sufficient conditions are required before we can say something is caused.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A summary of philosopher Wes Morriston’s point on this is as follows, “This is downright counter-intuitive. How could it be that necessary, but not sufficient, conditions can cause something to come into existence? Causation requires both.” [1]</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Either way, Miles has the burden of proof to establish that the Kalam Cosmological Argument is sound. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If I have not supported this view of causality properly, at the end that point would be a red herring. My </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">opponent has to show why we must view causality the way he does, instead of the way me and Wes </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Morriston do in order to claim that if something is uncaused, that means it came from nothing. Until he </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">does this, we are on good grounds to believe that even if something doesn’t come from absolutely </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">nothing, it could still be considered uncaused if there is a lack of sufficient conditions.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As far as the definition provided of “universe” is concerned, I do not really have any quarrels with it. I do </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">have some issues with his definition of “come into being”. The definitions from Miles are as follows:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“A. x begins to exist at t if and only if x comes into being at t.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">B. x comes into being at t if and only if (i) x exists at t, and the actual world includes no state of affairs in which x exists timelessly, (ii) t is either the first time at which x exists or is separated from any t′< t at which x existed by an interval during which x does not exist, and (iii) x’s existing at t is a tensed fact.”</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If we take a look at “A”, it basically states that “begins to exist” and “comes into being” are synonymous, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">which seems reasonable enough. What is the problem with “B” and his definition of “comes into being”? </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Well, it seems as if an important clause is missing. Even if all those clauses are satisfied, I would still deny </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">that we can say “x” came into being. Even if there are no states of affairs at which the universe is </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">timeless, A-Theory is true, and even if the universe has a finite past and a first moment, that doesn’t </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">mean it came into being; which is fatal to that definition. The term “into being” directly implies the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">universe was “out of being” prior. Thus, an extra clause should be:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(iv) Prior to t, x is out of being</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">This could be a temporally prior, or an atemporally prior; it doesn’t matter (which means that Craig’s </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">argument that time beginning to exist should not be settled by definition becomes futile). The idea that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the universe can come into being, even though it was never out of being raises red flags, and seems </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">impossible. It would be like saying you could place the basketball “into” the box, even though it was </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">never “out of” the box, as an “into” obviously implies a prior “out of”. Pro must not only show that the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">universe has a finite past, but he must also show that “sans the universe” can actually be plugged into </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the equation; a finite past of the universe (even assuming the A-Theory of time) does not accomplish </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">this. For all we know, there was no “prior” at all to the first moment of the universe 13.7 billion years </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">ago. Pro must show why we must go with Craig’s definition, over the revised definition I have put </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">forward including the extra clause.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Additionally, there is a difference between:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">a) There was nothing before the universe<br />b) There was no before the universe</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Time having a beginning lets us know that there was no temporally “before” the universe. When one </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">says that there was nothing before the universe, that assumes that there was a “before” the universe, at </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">which “nothing” existed (hence “nothing” “before”). However, that assumes there was a before the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">universe, which cannot mean the same thing as there was no before the universe. Thus, i) and ii) don’t </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">mean the same thing, even though they often get equated with each other.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Now that my disagreement with Pro’s definitions have been established, we can get right into the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">argument.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">III. Examining Premise (1)</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As I have argued in the definition section, something doesn’t have to come from nothing necessarily in </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">order to be considered uncaused. If it does, then Miles must prove how as he must show the Kalam </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Cosmological Argument sound. Even if we assume it does, what reasons do we have to believe that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">something cannot come from nothing? Miles seems to contradict himself. First he claims that the idea </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">that something cannot come from nothing is self-evident, but then he feels he has to argue for the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">notion that something cannot come from nothing based on a potentiality argument, and the fact that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">we don’t see something coming from nothing all around us. If one has to argue for a stance, then this </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">presupposes that the stance is not really self-evident. Miles has to choose whether ex nihilo nihil fit is </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">self-evident, or whether it is something that has to be argued for; he cannot have it both ways.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Is the premise self-evident? I would say of course not. It actually seems self-evident that this premise is </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">not self-evident. An example of a self-evident truth is:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“If an object has no edges at all, but has edges, this entails a contradiction.”</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Any reasonable person will come to see the truth of the above statement upon simple reflection. There </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">doesn’t seem to be anything self-evident about ex nihilo nihil fit, or any causal principle like there is with </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the example above. As Philosopher Quentin Smith points out:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">"Let's consider the first premise of the argument, that whatever has a beginning to its existence must have a cause. What reason is there to believe this causal principle is true? It's not self-evident; something is self-evident if and only if everyone who understands it automatically believes it. But many people, including leading theists such as Richard Swinburne, understand this principle very well but think it is false. Many philosophers, scientists, and indeed the majority of graduate and undergraduate students I've had in my classes think this principle is false. This principle is not self-evident, nor can this principle be deduced from any self-evident proposition." [2]</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As far as my opponent’s potentiality argument, I believe it fails. If there was absolute non-existence, that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">would seem to also include the absence of restrictions (as a restriction certainly is something). The idea </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">that something cannot come into being unless its potentiality is logged in something else implies a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">restriction of some kind, which wouldn’t seem to apply if there was absolute non-existence. At the very </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">least, Miles has to show why it would apply.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">My opponent then wonders why we don’t see things come into being from nothing all the time if this </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">can actually happen. This line of questioning presupposes that if something could come from nothing, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">that we would expect to see it all the time. If it does not, then why would an explanation for why we </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">don’t see something from nothing all the time be required? Miles has not defended the position that we </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">should see such an observation, so this line of questioning is trivial. Miles asks these odd questions, but </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">he hasn’t shown why we should even take these questions seriously. Therefore, it is not clear that these </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">questions really hurt the idea of something coming from nothing.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Miles additionally states that cause and effect is always observed in action, and we never see a lack of it </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">with regards to an effect. Of course, this is just an appeal to ignorance for an argument for the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">infallibility of the casual principle. If it is a fact that we never see a lack of a cause for an effect, that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">wouldn’t mean a lack of a cause for an effect couldn’t be the case (I’m not even sure it is that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">implausible). Regardless, I could invent a principle that states that all minds must be physically realized. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Since all observation confirms this, and nothing contradicts it, we can conclude God doesn’t exist by </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">default based on the same reasoning. Inductive reasoning with regards to generalizations is a tricky </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">slope a lot of the time, which leads me to not be convinced by Miles’ argument here. Someone who </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">grew up around all red apples could conclude all apples are red based on the same reasoning, but we </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">know there are green apples.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">IV. Examining Premise (2)</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I’ll accept that an infinite past is impossible, and that the past of the universe must be finite based on </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">philosophical and scientific argumentation. However, I would like to point out something rather </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">contradictory in Miles’s stance. He claims in the beginning of his paper he would like to use the term </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“sans the universe” instead of “before the universe”, as there can be no “before the universe”. Yet, in </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">his defense of Premise 2, he claims:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“Before this, the universe did not exist.”</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Can there be a “before the universe”, or can there not be? I personally see no problem with a “prior” to </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the universe, as long as it is not a “temporally prior”. However, there does seem to be this contradiction </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">pertaining to the position held by Miles.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Either way, my opponent has only shown that the universe had some type of beginning, but not that the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">universe came into being. Thus, according to his own definition of “begins to exist”, he did not complete </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">his task. A finite past of the universe by itself does not tell us whether or not the universe came into </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">being, so even if all of his arguments for a finite past succeed, it would be a non-sequitur to claim that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the universe coming into being follows from this. In order for the universe to have come into being, the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">universe must start off out of being (which is synonymous with “non-existent”), then the universe would </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">make its first appearance. Thus, if the universe came into being, we would have two stages:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Stage 1: The universe is non-existent<br />Stage 2: The first state of the universe exists and expands</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First we have an “out of being”, then an “in being”, which describes a proper “coming into being”. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">However, the universe could have a finite past without that scenario being the case. We can just cut </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Stage 1 out of the first scenario, and make Stage 2 the new Stage 1:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Stage 1: The first state of the universe exists and expands</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Above, we still have a universe with a finite past, but it doesn’t come into being as there is no previous </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">non-existence (or “out of being”) of the universe. Miles must not only show a beginning of the universe, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">but he must also show a “prior”, whether temporal or atemporal, to the first moment of the universe at </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">which no universe exists in order to show that it came into being. If the universe was never out of being, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">then the claim that it came into being makes little to no sense and is a clear misnomer. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">In these diagrams I show the difference between something with a finite past that does come into being, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">and something with a finite past that does not come into being. Basically, (i) shows something with a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">finite past that comes into being, and (ii) shows something with a finite past that does not come into </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">being:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As you can see with (i), prior to the first moment that thing exists, that thing is out of being. At first it </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">does not exist, then it exists. If you look at (ii), you will see there is no “prior” to the first moment it </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">exists at all, thus no “out of being” is plugged in. Basically, in (i) there is a “sans the universe” in the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">equation, and in (ii), there is no room for a “sans the universe” in the equation. Since both entail finite </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">pasts, then it is possible for there to be a finite past of the universe without it coming into being, as both </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">are conceivable scenarios.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Essentially, Miles must show the non-existence of the universe at some point to argue that it came into </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">being. A finite past (and even a beginning point) of the universe simply isn’t enough, even if we do </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">assume the A-Theory of time.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">V. Examining Premise (3)</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If we assume that the first two premises of the Kalam Cosmological Argument are true (which I </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">definitely do not concede), the question that remains pertains to whether the cause of the universe was </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">God or not. Miles claims that the cause must be timeless, spaceless, immaterial, changeless and </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">powerful. Even if we grant this, it means absolutely nothing as an argument for God unless we have </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">personality, a mind, or some kind of intelligence in the mix. Miles’ claim that the Atheist or the naturalist </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">should be horrified at this point is rather shocking, because without this cause being a personal mind; </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">God is not even close to established. If we also assume Miles’ view that something being uncaused </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">means it came from nothing for the sake of argument, then Alexander Vilenkin’s model of cosmic origins </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">describes how space, time, and energy could have emerged from a timeless and spaceless background </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">describable by the laws of nature[3]. This model specifically describes the universe emerging from a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">quantum tunnelling event with a finite size (a = H-1) and with a zero rate of expansion or contraction </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(da/dt = 0). It is plausible that the universe emerged in a symmetric vacuum state, which then decayed </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">with the inflationary era beginning; and after this era ended, the universe evolved according to the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">standard Big Bang model. Space-time and energy would essentially emerge out of a void with no space </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">or time. This means that there is no infinite regress implied by the model. The background would be </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">timeless, spaceless, powerful (the universe depends on it), immaterial, changeless, and describable by </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the laws of nature (since the background is not nothing, I assume Miles’ would consider this a “cause” </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">under his view). This is a completely naturalistic explanation of the universe’s origin and complies with </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">all the attributes mentioned by Miles so far. Ironically, Vilenkin is the one who Miles cites to support his </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">argument for God, but Vilenkin believes a beginning to the universe doesn’t really help the theist much:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“Theologians have often welcomed any evidence for the beginning of the universe, regarding it as evidence for the existence of God … So what do we make of a proof that the beginning is unavoidable? Is it a proof of the existence of God? This view would be far too simplistic. Anyone who attempts to understand the origin of the universe should be prepared to address its logical paradoxes. In this regard, the theorem that I proved with my colleagues does not give much of an advantage to the theologian over the scientist.” – Alexander Vilenkin [4]</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Vilenkin believes the universe can come into being scientifically and without reference to God, and I </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">agree. If my opponent has a problem with a state of affairs hypothetically describable by the laws of </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">nature existing without space and time, then I will defend the plausibility of that notion scientifically in </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">my next entry. So, I am sorry Miles, but nobody is horrified just yet. We have to know that this “cause” is </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">a personal mind, which means that all other attributes do nothing to establish God’s existence in reality. </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Even if Alexander Vilenkin’s model was false, my Atheism wouldn't be threatened one bit unless a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">personal mind was demonstrated.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Pro’s second argument is as follows:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“P1. If the universe has a cause, then that cause is either an abstract object or an unembodied mind.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">P2. An abstract object cannot be the cause of the universe.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">C: Therefore, if the universe has a cause, then that cause is an unembodied mind.”</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The first premise here is based on nothing more than a fallacious appeal to ignorance. He cannot think </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">of anything other than a mind or abstract object that can be timeless, spaceless, powerful, immaterial, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">or changeless so those must be the only two options? He contradicts himself. First Miles claims:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“[b]ecause the universe cannot be an abstract object, it must be an unembodied mind.”</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">However, the word “must” entails necessity. When he defends the dichotomy, he claims it is merely a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>prima facie</i> case. First of all, a <i>prima facie</i> case would only raise the probability of that thing being true, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">but it wouldn’t make it true with certainty. What Miles did was turn his argument into a probability </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">argument without even knowing it (where is the “probably” in the premises in the Kalam Cosmological Argument </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">though?). Miles has to make up his mind as to whether a mind “must” be the only option, or whether he </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">comes that to conclusion simply because he cannot think of anything else. It also must be shown why </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">prima facie</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> cases can be made for God’s existence, but not against God’s existence, and do this without </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">special pleading or begging the question. As I already alluded to, we can make a prima facie case that all </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">minds are physically realized, and God by definition is mind not physically realized. Now, Miles asserts </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">that even if it is possible for a third option, his options are still preferred because we conceive of them.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The problem with that is that he hasn’t defended the notion that an option we conceive of is more likely </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">than an option we do not when speaking of a cause of everything we know! One could argue that the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">universe seems to contain everything we know and interact with, so it is not far-fetched to assume that </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">the cause is most likely something we cannot just think of, as we wouldn’t know where to start being </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">spatio-temporal beings. Regardless, I can think of something else. Perhaps, sans the universe, there </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">exists a timeless, spaceless, immaterial, pre-universal state of affairs that the potential of the universe </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">was within, which includes an inherent nature entailing the spontaneous generation of the universe.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Perhaps this pre-universal background actually turned into the universe simultaneously with its creation, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">and now all that exists is the universe and what it contains. I can conceive of plenty of options, and the </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">fact that Miles cannot doesn’t make his dichotomy anymore sound. Miles hasn’t even come close to </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">defending his dichotomy as even a plausibly true dichotomy unfortunately.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Miles’ third argument is as follows:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“P1. If the universe has a cause, then the cause is either a set of impersonal causal conditions or a free, personal agent.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">P2. The cause of the universe is not set of impersonal causal conditions.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">C: Therefore, if the universe has a cause, then the cause is a free, personal agent.”</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The dichotomy in this argument is actually a true dichotomy because of the law of excluded middle once </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">we examine it. Either the cause is personal, or it is not the case that the cause is personal (or in other </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">words, the cause is an impersonal causal conditions). In this case, we can surely accept his dichotomy, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">because it is an “a or not a” dichotomy which is logically grounded. The problem is with the second </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">premise. The second premise would only be true if the impersonal causal conditions had to include </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">both:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">i) A necessary condition<br />ii) A sufficient condition</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A sufficient condition cannot exist without its effect, I completely agree. For example, if I pull the trigger </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">on a perfectly working loaded gun with the safety off you can bet that bullet being released is a direct </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">effect. Indeed, an atemporally eternal impersonal sufficient condition would imply an eternally existent </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">effect. A sufficient condition doesn’t seem to be required though. We can assume an unstable necessary </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">condition which has a nature entailing the spontaneous generation of the universe without a sufficient </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">cause of the universe. Miles’ argument presupposes if the universe had an impersonal necessary </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">condition, a sufficient cause is mandatory, and that spontaneity without prior determining sufficient </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">conditions is reserved for personality. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Of course, he has given no reasons to assume these things (we </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">actually have evidence in nature that spontaneity isn’t reserved for personality, but I will get into that if </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Miles mentions it). It isn’t even clear that a <i>prima facie</i> case can be made for personality being </span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">spontaneous, as neuroscience seems to show that there are in fact prior causal determining factors </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">involved with agent causality [5]. Miles just presupposes his view of agent causation, which is free from </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">prior determining factors acting like this is the view we should assume as fact pertaining to agent </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">causality in general. In any event, the second premise of the argument for the cause being God has </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">been undermined adequately. Thus, the argument fails.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Conclusion</span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">My opponent’s definitions were challenged by me right off the bat due to apparent problems, and this </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">doesn’t set the rest of his argument up to kindly. Miles’ support for Premise 1 of the Kalam Cosmological </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Argument is bizarre, because on one hand he claims the premise is self-evident, but then he presents </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">arguments in favor of the premise. The apparent need to do this indicates that the principle is not self-</span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">evident. I denied that the first premise is self-evident, and showed why his arguments do not succeed. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As far as Premise 2 of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is concerned, I grant that the universe has a </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">finite past, but demonstrate why that is not enough to establish the conclusion that the universe came </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">into being. The arguments for why the cause must be God were all flawed because the first argument </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">doesn’t demonstrate God at all, just that the cause must be timeless, spaceless, powerful, immaterial, </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">and changeless. The second argument is based on a dichotomy that Miles hasn’t shown to be a true </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">dichotomy. With regards to the third argument, I outlined a scenario without personal causation by </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">which the universe can come into existence without being eternal.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">None of the premises of the Kalam Cosmological Argument have been established as true by Miles. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Remember though, only one of my objections needs to go through in order for the Kalam Cosmological </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Argument to be considered successfully taken down in context.</span><br />
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<b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Notes</span></b></div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=10741</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>Big Bang Cosmology and Atheism: Why the Big Bang is No Help to Theists</i> by Quentin Smith (from Free Inquiry magazine, Volume 18, Number 2.)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">http://mukto-mona.net/science/physics/a_vilinkin/universe_from_nothing.pdf</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>Many Worlds In One by Alexander Vilenkin</i> (pg. 176)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=finding-free-will</span></li>
</ol>
Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-81142886052706102282013-10-16T12:46:00.001-07:002014-02-17T09:41:17.422-08:00The Kalam Cosmological Argument<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By Miles
Donahue</span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I. Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">In this extensive article, I will be presenting and defending the
famous </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">kalam</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> cosmological argument for the existence of God. In his 1979 book of the same name</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">, William Lane
Craig brought this argument to the forefront of philosophical discussion. The issues, objections, and counter-objections </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">surrounding</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> the argument are many, and form a
fractal-like pattern. So in this article I will not respond to objections, but will
wait for them to be raised by L.A. Mitchell. First, I’ll sketch the basic
premises of the argument, then define key terms used, next outline supporting arguments
for each premise, and end with concluding thoughts.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">The formulation of the </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">kalam</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;"> cosmological argument I will be defending goes like
this: [1]</span><br />
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<ol>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Everything
that begins to exist has a cause.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The
universe began to exist.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">If the
universe has a cause, there exists an uncaused, personal Creator of the
universe who </span><i style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">sans </i><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">the universe is beginningless, immaterial,
timeless, spaceless, changeless, and enormously powerful.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Therefore,
the universe has a cause (from 1 and 2).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">Therefore,
there exists an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who </span><i style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">sans </i><span style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">the
universe is beginningless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, changeless, and
enormously powerful (from 3 and 4).</span></span></li>
</ol>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">II. Preliminary
Definitions</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By "cause", I mean either an
efficient cause or a material cause, or both. An <i>efficient </i>cause
is something which brings its effect into being; this is generally what we mean by "cause". A <i>material</i> cause
is the stuff out of which something is made. For example, when a sculptor makes
a mug, the sculptor is the efficient cause of the mug, and the hunk of clay
from which the mug is made is the material cause. Premise (1) merely asserts
that everything that begins to exist has some sort of causal conditions, either
an efficient cause, a material cause, or both.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By "universe", I mean a connected or <i>contiguous </i>spacetime; I don’t mean
everything that exists or even all physical reality. If two things are causally
connected within time and space, then they are part of the same universe. As
cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin clarifies:</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“It [the universe] is certainly more than what we
can have access to. Regions beyond our cosmic horizon are included. But if
there are other universes whose space and time are completely disconnected from
ours, those are not included. So, by ‘universe’ I mean the entire connected
spacetime region.” [2]</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Under this definition, there can be other universes, for
there can be other disconnected spacetimes “out there”. All that I’m claiming
is that this connected spacetime which we find ourselves in began to exist.
Another universe cannot be the cause of this universe, because by definition
it would be causally disconnected from ours, and thus cannot be the cause of our universe.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By “begins to exist”, I mean the following, where “t” can be
a non-zero, finite interval of time, not necessarily an <i>instant</i> of time: [3]</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">A. </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> begins to
exist at </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> if and only if </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> comes into being
at </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">B. </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> comes into
being at </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> if and only if (i) </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> exists
at </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t,</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> and the actual world includes no state of affairs in
which </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> exists timelessly, (ii) </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> is either
the first time at which </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> exists or is separated from
any </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t′</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">< </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> at which </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> existed
by an interval during which </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> does not exist, and (iii) </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x’</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">s
existing at </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">t</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> is a tensed fact.</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Clause (i) asserts that if, for example, a table begins to
exist at 5:30, it must exist at 5:30, and that there is no state of affairs in
the actual world were that table exists timelessly (if the table has a timeless state of existence and "then" becomes temporal at 5:30, it wouldn't begin to exist). We’ll be discussing
timeless existence below. Clause (ii) makes clear that things can begin to
exist twice. To use the </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">previous</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> example, the table might have come into being
at 5:00, but then have been dismantled. So long as there is an interval of time
between 5:00 and 5:30 at which the table does not exist, it can begin to exist
again at 5:30 (perhaps the carpenter doesn’t like wasting wood). <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Clause (iii) ties the <i>kalam</i> cosmological argument to an A-Theory of time, according
to which tense and temporal becoming are real features of the world. In other
words, the present exists, but the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. Past events <i>did</i> exist
but no longer <i>do</i>, and future events <i>will</i> exist but do not <i>yet </i>exist. By “temporal becoming”, I
mean that things really do come into being and pass out of being. The strongest
argument for an A-Theory of time is the fact that we experience tense and temporal
becoming constantly (you experience yourself <i>waiting</i> for things to happen,
you experience things passing out of being, and you experience change). And in the absence of overwhelming
arguments for thinking the A-Theory of time is false, we should conclude that
our experience of temporal becoming is objective and real. The key idea here is
that we should assume our experience of something is objective/veridical in the
absence of reasons for thinking otherwise, which seems like an eminently
plausible principle. [4]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By “<i>sans</i> the universe”,
I mean “without the universe in existence.” The reason I’ve used this language
is that if the universe had a beginning, the cause of the universe can’t exist <i>before</i> the beginning of the universe,
because time is by definition part of the universe, and nothing can exist
before the beginning of time. Thus, we must speak of such a cause as existing
without the universe in existence; such a cause would exist timelessly is this
state. The creator of the universe is <i>causally
prior</i> to the beginning of the universe, but he is not <i>temporally</i> prior.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">In summary, I’m arguing that our connected spacetime manifold
came into being a, as defined above, at some point in the past and that it therefore requires some sort of
causal conditions to account for its coming into being, which exist </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">causally</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> prior to the beginning of the universe. With these clarifications
out of the way, let’s move on to the argument.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">III. Examining Premise (1)<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">There are three lines of evidence for premise (1), “whatever
begins to exist has a cause”:</span></span><br />
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18.399999618530273px;"><i>1.1 Something Cannot Come from Nothing</i></span></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">First</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, something cannot come from
nothing. This seems obvious, when you think about it. The potential
for something’s existence is always logged in something else. The potential for
a boat is logged in previously existing wood. For something to come into being
from nothing, the potentiality for its existence </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">couldn't</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> be logged in
anything, and therefore there is no potentiality for such a thing's existence. But if
something came into being without any causal conditions, it would come from
nothing (in other words, it would not come from anything). Therefore, whatever comes
into being must have some sort of causal conditions.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">For these reasons, I can't help but agree with the words of Dr. William Lane Craig,</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">"Like C. D. Broad, I find this notion [that something can arise without a cause] insupportable, and any world view taking this thesis on board will be eventually pulled under by its weight. The principle that something cannot come out of absolutely nothing strikes me as a sort of metaphysical first principle, one of the most obvious truths we intuit when we reflect philosophically." [5]</span></span></blockquote>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><i>1.2 Denial of (1) Leads to Absurdities</i></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, if something could come
into being out of nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why anything and
everything don’t come into being out of nothing. If universes can come
into being out of nothing, why can’t horses and potatoes likewise do so? If
they can, then why don’t they? Why aren’t lions and tigers and bears coming
into being right now, if it’s possible that they can? You can’t respond that
only things of a certain nature come into being uncaused, because a thing's
nature cannot </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">cause </i><span style="line-height: 115%;">it to begin to
exist </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">uncaused</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">. In other words, a thing's nature has no </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">relevance</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> to the state of affairs </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">explanatory</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> prior to that thing, lest we invoke self-causation. If someone affirms that
something came into being without a cause, not only can they not explain why
that thing exists, they cannot explain why an infinity of infinity of other things </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">do
not</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> exist. If you agree that it's absurd for a lion to come into existed uncaused, then you will agree that it's absurd for anything to come into being without a cause.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">1.3 </span></span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18.399999618530273px;">Empirical Support</span></span></i></div>
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Third</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, the
causal principle is constantly verified in experience and rests on a wealth of
empirical support. We constantly observe things coming into being by causes,
and never observe things beginning to exist without a cause. Premise (1) is so
universally verified by experience that its hard to say that it’s not, at the
very least, more plausibly true than false. From our experience of things
beginning to exist, we can make an </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">empirical</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> generalization that whatever
begins to exist has a cause.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">IV. Examining Premise (2)<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">There are four lines of evidence for premise (2), “the
universe began to exist”:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><span style="line-height: 115%;">2.1 Argument from the I</span><span style="line-height: 18.399999618530273px;">mpossibility</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> of an Actual Infinite</span></i></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">First</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, the argument from the
impossibility of an actually infinite number of things</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">. An
actual infinite is a collection of things whose total number of members is
infinite. It is not growing towards infinity, it is complete and actual. “</span></span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">À</span><sub>0</sub><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">”
(aleph-null) is the symbol used to represent such a collection. An example of
this would be the set of all positive numbers {1, 2, 3...}. On the other hand, a potential
infinite is a collection that is growing towards infinity as a limit, but is
always finite; such a collection is <i>indefinite</i>,
not infinite. The familiar symbol “</span></span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">¥</span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">” represents this sort of infinity.
I will argue that an actual infinite, so defined, cannot exist because its real
existence leads to absurdities.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The argument can be summarized as follows:</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(2.11) An actual infinite cannot
exist.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(2.12) An infinite temporal regress
of events is an actual infinite.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(2.13) Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Two considerations show the truth of premise of premise (1). </span><span style="line-height: 115%;">First, if an actual infinite could exist, contradictions would result. To see this, imagine an infinite collection of boxes. Suppose that each box has a number printed on it, created a one-to-one correspondence between a box and a positive number. Because the set of boxes is actually infinite, every positive number is used up; every positive number is labeled on some box. But then it would be </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">impossible</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> to add to the collection of boxes, because then we'd have to create a new positive number. But this is surely absurd, because any entity in reality can be numbered, and any collection in the real world can be added to. But if such a situation is really absurd, it follows that the existence of an actual infinite is likewise absurd.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Second, if an actually infinite collection could exist, such a collection could not be added to, which is absurd. To understand this, imagine an infinite collection of marbles, numbered 1, 2, 3, and so on out to infinite. You want to give your friend some marbles because he doesn’t have any. You take away all the even numbered marbles and give them to your friend. How many marbles do you have left? An infinite amount, for you still have all the odd numbered marbles. Here </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">infinity</i><span style="line-height: 18px;"> </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">minus </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">infinity </i></span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">equals</span></span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;"> </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">infinity.</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;"> </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">But now rewind the scenario</span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">, so that you have all the marbles again. This time you decide to give your friend all the marbles numbered three and above. How many marbles would you have left? Well, two. Here </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">infinite</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;"> minus </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">infinite</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;"> equals </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">two.</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;"> But this contradicts the answer we got in our first thought experiment. Thus, the real existence of an actual infinite leads to contradictions.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Because the real existence of an actual infinite leads to absurdities and contradictions, it cannot exist in reality. But, as premise (2.12) asserts, if
the universe were beginningless, then there would have been an actually
infinite number of events in the history of the universe prior to today, and this seems like an unobjectionable premise. Because an actually infinite number of past events cannot exist, the universe
cannot be beginningless. Rather, it had a beginning. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i><span style="line-height: 115%;">2.2 Argument from the I</span><span style="line-height: 18.399999618530273px;">mpossibility</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> of Forming an Actual Infinite</span></i></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, the
argument based on the successive formation of past events. E</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">ven if the first philosophical argument is false, the past still cannot be infinite because of </span><span style="line-height: 115%;">it's </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">successive </span><span style="line-height: 115%;">nature, as we shall see. The argument goes like this:</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(2.21) A collection formed by
successive addition cannot be actually infinite.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(2.22) The temporal series of past
events is formed by successive addition.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(2.23) Therefore, the temporal
series of past events is not actually infinite.</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Premise (2.21) asserts that an actually infinite collection
cannot be formed successively. </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">The word "successive" is key here. A collection formed </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">successively</span><span style="line-height: 18px;"> is a collection formed by adding one member after another; the entire collection is not given all at once, but is formed over time.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> Seeing that a collection formed in this way cannot be actually infinite seems obvious when we consider counting <i>to</i> infinity. If I start counting at 1,
no matter how fast I count I will never actually reach infinity. This is
because </span></span><span style="font-family: Symbol;">À</span><sub>0</sub><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><sub><span style="line-height: 115%;"> </span></sub><span style="line-height: 115%;">has
no immediate predecessor; you can always count one more number before reaching infinity. This has been called “the impossibility of traversing the infinite”. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Now someone might agree that an actually infinite collection cannot be formed
by counting <i>to</i> infinity, but
nevertheless such a collection could be formed by counting down <i>from</i> infinity, as would be the case in a
beginningless universe. </span></span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">But it seems to me that it’s even more evidently
impossible to count down from infinity than counting to infinity. Imagine walking into a forest and
finding an old man lying down counting. You overhear him say, “-3, -2, -1, 0!
I’ve finally reached 0!” When you ask him what he was doing, he tells you that
he just finished counting down all the negative numbers from eternity past.
Now, the man looks rather ancient, so he just might have counted all the
negative numbers.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">But there are two reasons the man could not have
counted them all. First, before he could count 0, he would have to count -1.
But before he could count -1, he would have to count -2. But before he could
count -2, he would have to count -3, and so on out to infinity. Before the man
could count <i>any</i> negative number, he
would have to count the number previous to it. Therefore, he could never count
any number. Indeed, before he could count any number, he could have to count an <i>infinity</i> of negative numbers prior to it! The man is pushed back and back into the infinite past, unable to count even a single number. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second, there’s no reason why the man didn’t reach 0 sooner than he
did. Let us stipulate that for every hour, the man counts one negative number. O</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">ne year previously, an actually infinite number of hours had already transpired. We can match up every negative number with an hour in the past, starting one year ago, s</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">o that the man had one hour to count each number an entire year
before he finished. So why didn’t he finish one year ago? Indeed, for any point
in the past you pick, the man should already be done, because by then an
actually infinite number of hours had already transpired, plenty of time to finish counting. The man should always
be done at any point in the past, and thus he should never be counting! From these two considerations, it
follows that a collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually
infinite.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">These two considerations apply equally well to
past events. First, before any event could occur, an event before that would
have to occur; no event could actually transpire. Second, for any event in the
past we pick, we can ask, why didn’t that event occur sooner? And by the same
reasoning, we are led to conclude that in any point in the past, any event
should already have transpired, and thus no event could ever occur.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">Turning to premise (2.22), this seems obvious.
The series of past events isn’t “given all at once", but is formed
successively throughout, and I’m sure Mitchell would agree. The conclusion therefore
follows that the number of past events in the history of the universe is not
actually infinite; it is finite. We must get back to a first event, the beginning
of the universe. Even if the first philosophical argument turns out to be unsound, this second argument still goes through, because they are independent of
one another.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><i>2.3 Big Bang Cosmology</i></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Third</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, modern
Big Bang cosmology implies an absolute beginning of the universe. In 1915,
Albert Einstein formulated his General Theory of Relativity (GR). One of the
disturbing implications of GR was that the universe could not be in a static,
unchanging state. A few years later physicists </span><span lang="EN" style="line-height: 115%;">Alexander Friedmann and Georges Lemaître </span><span style="line-height: 115%;">found
solutions to the equations of GR which predicted an expanding universe. In
1929, Edwin Hubble observed the light from distant galaxies was shifting
towards the red end of the spectrum, which implied that they were
moving away from us at fantastic speeds. This in turn implied the universe was
expanding. Hubble's observation was the first of many empirical confirmations of what later
became known as the Big Bang theory, or the Standard Model.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><img src="http://www.debate.org/photos/albums/1/3/2675/87140-2675-xprv5-a.jpg" /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Figure 1 - The Standard Big Bang Model</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Because the Standard Model is based on the
equations of general relativity, it doesn’t predict that galaxies are being pushed apart from a
central point, but rather that <i>space itself </i>is expanding. As you
trace the expansion backwards in time, space gets smaller and galaxies get
closer together. The universe gets denser and denser, until you reach a time
when everything is crushed down to a point. The density of the universe at this
point is infinite. Before this, the universe did not exist. As physicists Barrow and
Tipler explain, "At this singularity, space and time came into existence;
literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe
originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation <i>ex
nihilo.</i>" [6]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Four of the world’s most prominent astronomers comment:</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“The universe began from a state of
infinite density. . . . Space and time were created in that event and so was
all the matter in the universe. It is not meaningful to ask what happened
before the Big Bang; it is like asking what is north of the North Pole.
Similarly, it is not sensible to ask where the Big Bang took place. The point-universe
was not an object isolated in space; it was the entire universe, and so the
answer can only be that the Big Bang happened everywhere.” [7]</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Thus, we can be confident that according to the Standard
Model, the universe had an absolute beginning in the finite past. But the
question remains, is this prediction of the Standard Model correct? There are
three principle arguments in favor of the Standard Model: (i) the observed
abundances of helium and hydrogen, which were predicted by the Big Bang theory,
(ii) the observed temperature of the cosmic background radiation, which was
also predicted by the Big Bang theory, and (iii) the “red-shift” of light from
distant galaxies, which is best explained by the expansion of the universe. And, insofar as general relativity predicts
an expanding universe, all of the evidence for the general theory of relativity
will count in favor of the Standard Model as well. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Some object that because general relativity breaks down at
the first split-second of the universe (1</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">0</span><sup style="line-height: 115%;">-43
</sup><span style="line-height: 115%;">seconds</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">), w</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">e cannot say what happened during this
time. Perhaps the universe arose from the quantum vacuum. While it’s true that
the Standard Model is incomplete for these reasons, it’s irrelevant. In 2003,
three cosmologists, Arvind Borde, Alan Guth, and Alexander Vilenkin crafted the BGV theorem, which shows that any universe which
is on average in a state of cosmic expansion throughout its history cannot be
eternal in the past. In their own words:</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">"Our argument shows that null and time-</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">like geodesics are, in general, past-incomplete in infla</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tionary models, whether or not energy conditions hold, </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">provided only that the averaged expansion condition </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">Hav> 0 holds along these past-directed geodesics. This </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">is a stronger conclusion than the one arrived at in pre</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">vious work in that we have shown under reasonable </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">assumptions that almost all causal geode-sics, when ex</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">tended to the past of an arbitrary point, reach the bound</span><span style="line-height: 18px;">ary of the inflating region of spacetime in a finite proper </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">time..." [8]</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">A
remarkable feature of the BGV theorem is that its independent of the physical
conditions of the universe in its early stages, so a quantum theory of gravity wont affect the </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">fundamental</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> prediction of the Standard Model of an absolute beginning to the universe. Alexander Vilenkin remarks,</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“A remarkable thing about this
theorem is its sweeping generality. . . . We did not even assume that gravity
is described by Einstein’s equations. So, if Einstein’s gravity requires some
modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made
was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value.”
[9]</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .5in;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">So long as our universe is on average in a state of
cosmic expansion, it doesn’t matter what the physics of the very early universe
turn out to be. Loop quantum gravity models, no-boundary models, and closed
time-like curve models have all been proposed to restore an eternal universe,
but they all fail. Indeed, the consistent failure of supposed “past-eternal” models
testifies to the strength of the evidence for a cosmic beginning. If Mitchell
suggests a model as a possible defeater of premise (2), I will respond to it
then.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>2.4 The Second Law of Thermodynamics</i></span></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Fourth</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, the
second law of thermodynamics predicts a beginning of the universe. The second
law asserts that any closed system tends towards a state of equilibrium; all
closed systems tend to run down and quit. In such a system, the usable energy
is running out. Another expression of the second law is that warm bodies
radiate their heat to cold bodies. In the bath, for example, the water is never
hot on one side and cold on the other; the heat diffuses itself evenly
throughout the tub.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The same can be said about the universe. Even in the
nineteenth century, physicist realized that the second law had grim
implications for the universe as a whole. For the universe is a closed-system,
and thus it is heading towards a state of heat death, where everything will be
equally diffused throughout the universe; there will be no complex structures to speak of. All matter, energy, and heat, will be
spread out through the cosmos, becoming every darker and colder. There will be
no sun, stars, planets, or life. But the inevitable question arises: if, given
sufficient time, the universe will reach such a state, why is it not now in that
state? If the universe were eternal in the past, then we should have reach equilibrium
an infinite time ago! This suggest that the universe is not eternal, but began to exist at some point in the past.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Physicist Paul Davies comments,</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“Today, few cosmologists doubt that
the universe, at least as we know it, did have an origin at a moment in the
finite past. The alternative – that the universe has always existed in one form
or another – runs into a rather basic paradox. The sun and stars cannot keep
burning forever: sooner or later they will run out of fuel and die. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The same is true of all irreversible
physical processes; the stock of energy available to drive them is finite and
cannot last for eternity. This is an example of the so-called second law of thermodynamics,
which, applied to the entire cosmos, predicts that it is stuck on a one-way
slide of degeneration and decay towards a final state of maximum entropy, or
disorder. As this final state has not yet been reached, it follows that the
universe cannot have existed for an infinite time.” [10]</span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">To summarize, on the basis of two philosophical arguments, the argument
based on the impossibility of an actually infinite number of things, the
argument based on the successive formation of past events, modern Big Bang
cosmology, and the second law of thermodynamics, I conclude that premise (2) is
more plausibly true than false. The universe began to exist at some point in
the finite past, and thus, in conjunction with premise (1), there is a cause of
the universe.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">V. Examining Premise (3)<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">There are three lines of evidence for premise (3), “if the universe has a
cause, there exists an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who <i>sans
</i>the universe is beginningless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, changeless,
and enormously powerful”.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18.399999618530273px;"><i>3.1 Conceptual Analysis</i></span></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">First</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, a
conceptual analysis of what it means to be a cause of the universe establishes
many of these attributes. As a cause of space and
time, this cause must be spaceless and timeless. It must therefore be
immaterial and changeless, because anything material is spatially extended, and
anything changing must be temporal. This cause must be uncaused, for as we’ve
seen there cannot be an infinite regress of causes; you must get back to an
Uncaused First Cause. This cause must therefore be beginningless, for anything
with a beginning has a cause, and this cause is uncaused. The cause of the
universe must be enormously powerful, for it brought all of space and time,
matter and energy, into being out of nothing. Thus, by conceptual analysis
alone, we’ve seen that the cause of the universe must be uncaused,
beginningless, timeless, spaceless, changeless, immaterial, and enormously
powerful. The atheist should be getting pretty uncomfortable at this point, and
the naturalist should be horrified. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>3.2 Unembodied Minds Vs. Abstract Objects</i></span></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, because the universe
cannot be an abstract object, it must be an unembodied mind.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> As
we’ve seen, the cause of the universe must at least be uncaused, beginningless,
timeless, spaceless, changeless, and immaterial. Now there
are only two conceivable entities which fit this description: unembodied minds
and abstract objects (numbers, propositons, sets, ideas, etc.). But the problem is, abstract objects can’t cause
anything. That’s definitional of an abstract object. Therefore, the cause of
the universe must be an unembodied mind.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">We can summarize the argument as follows: [11]</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(4.11) If the universe has a cause,
then that cause is either an abstract object or an unembodied
mind.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(4.12) An abstract object cannot be
the cause of the universe.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(4.13) Therefore, if the universe
has a cause, then that cause is an unembodied mind.</span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The fact that we can’t conceive of a third alternative gives
us <i>prima facie</i> reason to accept the
truth of (4.11). If my opponent wishes to suggest a third candidate, I will
discuss it. But until he does this, premise (4.11) must be considered complete. At
this point, many object that there could be other candidates for a cause of the
universe, but we just don’t know what they are. The problem, though, is that a
dilemma (either a or b), can be valid even if there are logically possible
options (c, d, etc.). So even if it’s logically possible that there is another candidate for
a cause of the universe, an unembodied mind and an abstract object will still
be the best explanations, for an <i>unknown</i> explanation can never be better than a <i>known</i> explanation. Premise (4.11) represents the two best explanations for the origin
of the universe, and thus is true, even if there are logically possible
exceptions.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><i>3.3 Impersonal Conditions Vs. Personal Agents</i></span></span></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span></b></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">Third</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;">, the cause
of the universe must be a free, personal agent. The argument goes like this: [12]</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(4.21) If
the universe has a cause, then the cause is either a set of impersonal causal
conditions or a free, personal agent.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(4.22) The
cause of the universe is not set of impersonal causal conditions.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">(4.23) Therefore,
if the universe has a cause, then the cause is a free, personal
agent.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> </span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormalCxSpMiddle">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Looking at premise (4.21), the only evidence needed to
establish its plausibility is simply the fact that no third alternative has
ever been suggested. Again, the fact that we can’t conceive of a third
alternative gives us <i>prima facie</i>
reason to accept the truth of the premise. If Mitchell, or anyone else, suggests
a third alternative, we will add it to the list and consider it. But until that
happens, (4.21) must be considered exhaustive, and thus true. Turning to
premise (4.22), the cause of the universe cannot be an impersonal set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, because then the universe would be eternal. If the cause of the universe were beginningless, why is the
effect (the universe) not beginningless as well? If the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of the universe were set from eternity past (which
would have to be the case if the universe were an impersonal set of causal
conditions), then the universe should exist from eternity past as well.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">For example, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for water freezing are the temperature falling below 32 F. But if the temperature
had been below 32 F from eternity past, then any water around would be frozen from
eternity past as well. There would be no way for the water to <i>begin</i> to freeze at some point in time.
Similarly, if the cause of the universe were a beginningless, impersonal set of
necessary and sufficient conditions, then the universe should be beginningless
as well. The only way out of this dilemma is through what philosopher’s call <i>agent causation</i>. Agents can freely will
new effects in time, without any prior determining conditions. Thus, a man sitting
from eternity could freely will to stand up at any point in the past.
Similarly, a personal, beginningless cause can choose to create a universe with
a beginning. Thus, premise (4.22) is more plausibly true than false.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">VI. Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">To conclude, we’ve seen that (1) everything that begins to
exist has a cause, that (2) the universe began to exist, and that (3) </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">if the universe has a cause, there exists an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">sans </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">the universe is beginningless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, changeless, and enormously powerful. From these three premises it follows necessarily that the universe has a cause, and therefore there exists </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">sans </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">the universe is beginningless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, changeless, and enormously powerful. This should certainly disturb any atheist worth the name.</span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Notes</span></span></b></div>
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<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">This basic formulation comes from: William Lane Craig, and
James Sinclair, “The </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Kalam</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> Cosmological Argument,” in </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">The
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.</i></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Vilenkin, Alexander, as found at “What Does One Mean by “the Universe”?, </span><a href="http://www.reasonablefaith.org/what-does-one-mean-by-the-universe"><span style="line-height: 18px;">http://www.reasonablefaith.org/what-does-one-mean-by-the-universe</span></a><span style="line-height: 18px;">.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Craig, William Lane, “J. Howard Sobel on the Kalam
Cosmological Argument” </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Reasonable Faith.</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">
(</span><a href="http://www.reasonablefaith.org/j-howard-sobel-on-the-kalam-cosmological-argument" style="line-height: 115%;">http://www.reasonablefaith.org/j-howard-sobel-on-the-kalam-cosmological-argument</a><u style="line-height: 115%;">)
</u><span style="line-height: 115%;">14 Oct. 2013</span><u style="line-height: 115%;">.</u></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">What this analysis means is that </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">
can still begin to exist even if there is no first </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">instant</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> of </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">’s existence.
Indeed, in order for an object to begin moving, there cannot be a first instant
of said motion. This definition also means that there needn’t be past moments
of time prior to </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> in order for </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">x</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> to begin to exist. If there had to be
moments prior to something in order for it to begin to exist, then asserting
that time began to exist would be a literal self-contradiction, but clearly
it’s not.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Craig, William Lane, <i>Theism, Atheism, And Big Bang Cosmology</i>, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Print. 273.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">John Barrow and Frank Tipler, </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">The Anthropic
Cosmological Principle</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 442</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Richard J. Gott, </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">et.al.</i><span style="line-height: 18px;">, "Will the Universe Expand Forever?" </span><i style="line-height: 18px;">Scientific American </i><span style="line-height: 18px;">(March 1976), p. 65.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Arvind Borde, Alan H. Guth, and Alexander Vilenkin,
“Inflationary Spacetimes are not Past-Complete” Web. (16 Oct. 2013) </span></span><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><a href="http://arxiv.org/pdf/grqc/0110012.pdf">http://arxiv.org/pdf/grqc/0110012.pdf</a>.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Vilenkin,
Alexander. </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other
Universes. </i><span style="line-height: 115%;">New York: Hill and Wang, 2006. Print. 175.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Davis, Paul, “The Big Bang – and Before,” The Thomas Aquinas
College Lecture Series, Thomas Aquinas College, Santa Paula, Calif., March
2002.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Craig, </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">William</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> Lane “Design
and the Cosmological Argument” </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Leader U</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">,
14 Oct. 1013, (</span><a href="http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/design-cosmoarg.html"><span style="line-height: 115%;">http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/design-cosmoarg.html</span></a><span style="line-height: 115%;">).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Ibid.</span></li>
</ol>
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Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-90689472994180372732013-10-09T15:14:00.000-07:002013-10-20T16:10:17.681-07:00A Criticism of Cosmological Atheology<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By Miles
Donahue</span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I. Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">In less than 24 hours after publishing “General Relativity
Proves What, You Say?: A Response to L. A. Mitchell”, Mr. Mitchell wrote an
eight page counter-response [1]. In this article, I’ll review key terms used in
the argument, criticize his responses to my refutation, expand on my original
criticisms, and end with concluding thoughts. I take it as given that he and I
are expected to maintain an appropriate level of respect and cordiality towards
one another as we discuss these issues and arguments.</span></span><br />
<a name='more'></a></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">II. A First State of Time<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitchell only stated disagreement with my definition of one
of the four key terms used in the entailment argument, so I will assume he agrees with the other three. He disagrees with my definition of a first
state of time:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">First state of time</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"> - the very first interval of time, whether a closed
interval or a half-open interval; such an interval can be modeled algebraically as 0 < <i>t </i>≤ 1.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But the careful reader will notice that although he disagreed
with my definition of the term, he didn’t provide an alternative definition which evaded his objection, so
we simply have to wonder what Mitchell means by “first state of time”.
Nevertheless, what objections does Mitchell raise to my definition? He claims
that, “There is an earlier interval than this interval [0 < <i>t</i> ≤
1], which is the interval 0 < t ≤ .9. This is an earlier interval
than 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1 because it does not contain states of
time which correspond to the real numbers between .9 and 1.” This response strikes me as
misconceived, on three counts. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First, a first interval of time will differ from context to
context, based on what unit of measure is being used (e.g., hours, minutes,
seconds, etc.), and this isn’t inconsistent with saying that a first interval
of time has <i>parts</i>. Indeed, any
interval of time in any event can be subdivided into smaller parts. Thus, the
first interval of a second in the history of the universe can be subdivided
into the first nano-second, being followed by other nano-seconds, or what have
you. Second, the interval 0 < <i>t </i>≤
.9 is in no sense <i>earlier</i> than 0
< <i>t</i> ≤ 1. If it was, then the inequality 0 < <i>t </i>≤ .9 < 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1, would be true, and
clearly it’s not. [2] Rather, “0 < <i>t </i>≤
.9” is simply a part of “0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1”. Third, his objection
applies equally to his original definition of the term. Recall that Mitchel
defined “first state of time” as “a line segment with a maximum value and a
minimum value.” He gave the following picture to represent the idea.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV72JEzBFY6qBgxSfnRrx-YgBI7i0n0fQn41Jyy-b1Fs6hnQZye3m0kB0aymGEGBSeYrQ3G8Y1bKOPmfY_Zb1WnEq5wu5Ie4ualUaRdsHpI65rwU7kJolQmaoBDGP4t7l-s502ClzUFb4/s400/closed.jpg" /></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But then if we grant Mitchell’s objection, his definition
goes out the window, for we can subdivide interval AB into AM (where M is
halfway between A and B), and AM would be earlier than AB, according to
Mitchell, and thus AB would not represent the first state of time, which contradicts his original definition.</span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">III. Quantum Gravity<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Here there was some substantial interaction with
my objections. The reader will recall that I raised two objections to the
entailment argument based on quantum gravity: (i) General Relativity is an
incomplete theory of the world, and (ii) certain quantum theories of gravity imply
the falsehood of premise (1). With regard to (i), the reader needs to
understand that Quantum Mechanics, the other pillar of modern day physics, is
incompatible with General Relativity. But they’re equally successful theories,
and thus we must seek a deeper theory of the world, a quantum theory of gravity
which marries General Relativity with Quantum Mechanics. And it seems to me
that to try to argue that because a theory we know to be incomplete, a theory
we know will need changes, implies the truth of premise (1) therefore premise (1) is true just </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">isn't</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> an
argument for (1), because we don’t know whether premise (1) will remain
true in light of a quantum theory of gravity. This isn’t just musing about
possibilities; rather I’m claiming that we have no reason to prefer one possibility (every state of the universe is caused by a previous state) over the another (every state of the universe is not caused by a previous state). We must therefore be agnostic about the truth of the premise.
[3] So far as I can see, Mitchell raised no counter-objections to (i), so the
criticism goes through.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Concerning (ii), I argued that a certain theory of quantum
gravity implied that premise (1) was false, because on this theory you can’t
divide the first interval of the history of the universe into neat stacks of
universe-states which each explain each other. </span></span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Mitchell raises two objections to (ii). First, he claims that
he can’t assess the evidence for this theory of quantum gravity because I
didn’t name the approach to QG I was talking about, and therefore it
can’t be considered an argument. I simply beg to differ. Look at the first line
of the my quote from William Lane Craig, “A typical approach to marrying quantum theory
to General Relativity involves describing the evolution of spacetime as a path
integral (a sum over all possible paths) in superspace…” This clearly
identifies the theory of quantum gravity I’m talking about, namely, Feynman’s
“sum-over-histories”. Stephen Weinstein and Dean
Rickles, both philosophers of science, comment:</span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“…the peculiar nature of general
relativity and quantum gravity, with respect to the treatment of time,
resurfaces in arguably the most covariant of approaches, the Feynman
path-integral approach. In this case that central task is to compute the
amplitude for going from an initial state to a final state (where these states
will be given in terms of boundary data on a pair of initial and final
hypersurfaces). The computation of this propagator proceeds à la
sum-over-histories: one counts to the number of possible spacetimes that might
interpolate between the initial and final hypersurfaces.” [4]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Second, Mitchell claims that my failure to explicitly name the particular theory
of quantum gravity I’m talking about, “leads to doubt about the validity of the
model. If [I] will not even name the model, then this suggests that there is
some flaw which could be brought up if [Mitchell] knew what it was.” Let me assure Mitchell that I would never put forward an argument, or an objection to an argument, if I didn't think it was sound, and I hope to have demonstrated as much in this particular case.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitchell spends a great deal of time arguing against quantum
theories of gravity. The essence of his argument is summed up as follows:</span></span></div>
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<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Quantum gravity models require the Minkowski interpretation
of special relativity.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The Minkowski interpretation of special relativity is false.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Quantum gravity models are false.</span></span></li>
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<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">I agree that the argument is logically valid, and that
premise (2) is true, so the only question is whether premise (1) is true. In raising the objection to premise (1) that I am, Mitchell asserts that I’m
contradicting my own worldview, and that this somehow implies I’m giving a
contradictory argument. I’m not sure what relevance this has, if it’s not to be
a thinly veiled </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">ad hominem</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;"> argument.
Suffice it to say that concerns about my personal worldview are irrelevant to
the truth of the arguments I give. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">In defense of (1), all Mitchell really says is this, “Mainstream
quantum gravity is based on Einstein’s general theory of relativity, which in
turn is based on the Minkowski interpretation of special relativity.” I have no
desire to disagree. The problem, though, is that because General Relativity and
Quantum Mechanics are incomplete theories of nature, a quantum theory of
gravity will have to sacrifice certain aspects of both in order to make them
cohere. As Weinstein and Rickles comment,</span><br />
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“These various approaches can be
catalogued in various ways, depending on the relative weight assigned to general
relativity and quantum field theory. Some approaches view general relativity as
in need of correction and quantum field theory as generally applicable, while
others view quantum field theory as problematic and general relativity as
having a more universal status. Still others view the theories in a more
even-handed manner, perhaps with both simply amounting to distinct limits of a
deeper theory.” [5]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Thus, it’s entirely fallacious to argue that because General
Relativity implies the ontology or structure of Minkowskian relativity,
therefore a quantum theory of gravity will do so as well. The latter just
doesn’t follow from the former. One might also add that some physicists have
argued that a quantum theory of gravity might actually imply presentism, the
view that only the present exists, which is antithetical to Minkowskian
relativity. [6] The premise, “Quantum gravity models require the Minkowski
interpretation of special relativity” just ain’t necessarily so, and might
actually be shown to be false as theories of quantum gravity develop.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I conclude, then, that premise (1), “Every state of the
universe is sufficiently caused by a previous state”, has not been shown to be
true, and thus the entailment argument is not a good argument for atheism. [7]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">IV. Examining the Entailment Argument<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The reader will recall that I raised two main
objections to the entailment argument, (i) we can construct parallel arguments
which lead to false conclusions, and (ii) reference to the various states of
the universe cannot answer the question of why the universe began to exist. </span></span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">First, I gave two examples of things coming into being
without a first state of their existence, and yet having external causes: Mitchell’s
truncated life [8], and the motion of a
tennis ball. Turning to Mitchell’s truncated life, I'll sketch the
premises of this parody argument so that the reader will see the parallel that
exists between it and the entailment argument for atheism:</span><br />
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Every state of Mitchell’s
truncated life is sufficiently caused by a previous state. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">An external cause of the Mitchell’s
truncated life can only exist if there is a state of his truncated life that
was not sufficiently caused by a previous state of his life. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Therefore, Mitchell’s truncated
life has no external cause. </span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Or consider the entailment argument based on the motion of a tennis ball.
As before, we can summarize the argument to see its parallel to the original entailment argument:</span></div>
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<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Every state of the motion of
the tennis ball is sufficiently explained in a previous state. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">An external cause of the
tennis ball can only exist if there is a state of the motion of the tennis ball
that was not sufficiently caused by a previous state of the ball. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Therefore, motion of the
tennis ball has no external cause. </span></li>
</ol>
</div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It seems quite obvious that the above two entailment
argument parodies and the original entailment argument are parallel, so that if one is
valid, all three are valid, and if one is invalid, all three are invalid.
Similarly, if one contains a false premise, all three contain a false premise.
They stand or fall together. Nevertheless, Mitchell objects, <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“The deletion of the first instant
of my birth is arbitrary and there are no reasons to do so. The key difference
between the two deletions is that a first instant of the universe is physically
impossible, while a first instant of my birth is physically possible.” <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I think this misunderstands the argument. What I was saying
in the first parody argument based on Mitchell's life is that the same reasoning used to
conclude that the universe cannot have an external cause can be used to show
that Mitchell’s <i>truncated</i> life
doesn’t have an external cause. Remember, we’re just considering a segment of
Mitchell’s life, not his entire life. Mitchell's truncated life doesn't include that first instant because it's simply not part of the interval of his life we're considering. The first
instant is still there, but the interval of time including that instant is <i>longer</i> than the interval of time
containing Mitchell’s truncated life. Indeed, in any closed interval of time, a
half-open interval of time is still there, so to speak, it’s just that the
half-open interval of time is shorter than the closed interval of time. The first instant of his life isn't deleted; when considering Mitchell's truncated life, it simply isn't there to begin with. There may be a first state of Mitchell's <i>entire</i> life, but there is not a first state of Mitchell's <i>truncated</i> life.</span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">He also states,<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“Vallicella seems to think that the
argument reasons that since there is a continuum of half-open states, there
cannot be an external cause. Rather, the reasoning is that a first instant is
physically impossible, ergo there is a continuum of half-open states, ergo
there is no external cause. Vallicella’s parody cannot be equal to Smith’s
argument because it cannot contain the false premise ‘the first instant of my
birth is physically impossible’.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Now this remark is very interesting, because if you look at
the original entailment argument in either formulation, <i>it itself</i> doesn’t contain the premise “the first state of the
universe is physically impossible.” Rather, that statement is used as <i>evidence</i> for premise (1). But so what?
The evidence for premise (1) of the first parody entailment argument is simply that we’re considering the half-open interval of time between Mitchell's birth and some arbitrary point in time; there cannot be a first state of his
truncated life, by definition, because it's contained in a half-open interval of time. But interestingly, the reason premise (1) of the second parody argument is true is because it’s physically impossible for
there to be a first state of the ball’s motion, for reasons I explained in my previous
article. So even if the first parody argument is shown not to be parallel to the original entailment argument, the second argument based on motion would.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The reasoning in all three entailment arguments is this: (i)
there is no first state of <i>X</i>, thus (ii) there is a half-open continuum of time
between the beginning of <i>X</i> and some arbitrary point in time, and therefore (iii) there is
no external cause of <i>X</i>. In all three entailment arguments there cannot be a first
state of that thing, for various reasons. I conclude that all three entailment
arguments are parallel to each other, and so if one is sound, all three are
sound. Conversely, if one is unsound, all three are unsound. But the above two parody arguments are unsound; each entity being considered has an external cause. Thus, the original
entailment argument for atheism is also unsound.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I’m mystified when Mitchell says that the third parody argument
concerning the motion of the tennis ball “can be solved through invoking
supertasks.” I have no idea how this consideration shows the third argument not to be parallel, or how it shows that the motion of the tennis ball has a first state. I’m not
asking how the tennis ball could have started moving; rather I’m showing that
the motion of the tennis ball could not have a first state, and thus should not
have an external cause, if the reasoning of the original entailment argument were
correct. I have no idea what the argument about supertasks is supposed to be.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitchell rightly points out that, “My argument is not that we
can explain the universe by saying that each state of the universe is caused by
a previous state, although I think that’s true. The argument only seeks to
eliminate a certain type of cause from the different causes that we can
consider.” But then he seems to have forgotten this when he quotes Quentin
Smith who argues that the universe is self-caused. It doesn’t matter if my
parody arguments don’t show that universe isn’t self-caused; they weren’t
intended to. Rather, <i>what they show is
that Mitchell’s entailment argument doesn’t establish the conclusion that the
universe doesn’t have an external cause.</i> At this point in the argument, for
all we know the universe might be self-caused, or it might have an external
cause. The argument for a self-caused universe and the argument that the
universe cannot have an external cause are two different arguments, and we need
to keep them distinct. For these reasons, I will simply ignore the arguments
given by Quentin Smith, Robin Collins, and Paul Draper, because they concern a <i>different</i> argument than Mitchell’s
entailment argument.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second, I argued that reference to the various states of the universe
cannot explain why the universe began to exist, and so there must be an
external cause of the universe to explain why it began to exist rather than
existing eternally. The argument, stated </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">explicitly</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> is as follows:</span></span></div>
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</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Whatever begins to exist has either an internal cause or an
external cause.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The universe began to exist.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Therefore, the universe has either an internal cause or an external cause.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The universe cannot have an internal cause.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Therefore, the universe has an external cause.</span></span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Mitchell and I agree that premise (2) is true, so the whole
debate comes down to whether premises (1) and (4) are true. With regard to (1),
let me give three lines of evidence for its truth [9].</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">First, something cannot come from nothing.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> This
seems obvious, when you think about it. The potential for something’s existence
is always logged in something else. The potential for a boat is logged in
previously existing wood. For something to come into being from nothing, the
potentiality for its existence couldn’t be logged in anything, and therefore
there is no potentiality for its existence. But if something came into being
without a cause, it would come from nothing. Therefore, whatever
comes into being must have some sort of cause.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second, if something could come into being out of nothing, then it becomes
inexplicable why anything and everything don’t come into being out of nothing<b>.</b></span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> If universes can come into
being out of nothing, why can’t horses and potatoes likewise do so? If they
can, then why don’t they? Why aren’t lions and tigers and bears coming into
being right now, if it’s possible that they can? If you affirm that something
came into being without a cause, not only can you not explain why that being
exists, you cannot explain why an infinity of infinity of begins do not exist.
That, at least to me, is too high a price to pay for a denial of premise (1).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Third, common experience confirms and never falsifies premise (1).</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> We
constantly observe that things which come into being have causes, and never
observe things beginning to exist without causes. Therefore, we can make an
inductive generalization that whatever begins to exist has a cause. Now, I’m
inclined to view this third point as mere support for premise (1), not the basis of its
truth. The first and second lines of evidence serve as the foundation for (1), and point three could be
thought of as a supporting beam.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Concerning the truth of premise (4), I’ll refer back to what
I said in the previous article:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“…we can show that the universe not
only <i>could</i> have an external cause if its earliest interval is
half-open, but <i>needs</i> an external cause, because the question,
“Why did the universe begin to exist?” is still left unanswered, even if the
universe’s earliest interval is half-open. Pointing out that each state of the
universe is caused by a previous state might show give an explanation as to why
the universe <i>exists</i>, but not as to why the universe <i>began</i> to
exist….If the universe were eternal, then every state of the universe would
have an explanation in terms of a previous state as well, so merely showing
that every state of the universe has an explanation in terms of a previous
state wouldn’t go one inch in explaining why the universe began to exist,
instead of existing eternally.” [10]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I conclude that the universe has an external cause, implying
the falsehood of the entailment argument for atheism, leading as it does to a
false conclusion.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Despite all that’s been said, there’s still the question, “if
the first temporal interval of the universe of the universe is half-open, then
every state of the universe is caused by a previous state, so where, so to
speak, does God cause the universe to come into being? Which state of the
universe does God cause?” I'll sketch two responses to the question. First, God can still create the universe at first instant of <i>metaphysical</i> time, even in <i>physical</i> time has no first instant. This argument is given, ironically, by Paul Draper and Quentin Smith:</span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">"What
he [Robin Collins] means to suggest is that God's creative act might be a part
of the complete causal history of any universe state, even if the universe did
not exist at t0 [the first instant of time] and so did not have any first
moment of existence. (Similarly, the exploding gunpowder is a part of the
complete causal history of any flight state even if the flight of the
cannonball did not exist at t1 and had no first moment of existence)...Collins
could best state his case by supposing that there is a metaphysical time series
in which God exists and that any physical time correlates to a metaphysical
time. He could then argue that, even though there is no t0, there is a
metaphysical time T0 at which there is a divine creative act that causally originates
the physical time series and all the universe states in this physical time
series. In other words, Collins could plausibly claim that, even if
the </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">physical</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> causal history of the universe has no first
moment, it is possible that the </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">complete</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> (metaphysical and
physical) causal history of the universe does..." [11]</span></span></blockquote>
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Even if the physical time series of our universe had no first instant and thus no state of the universe lacking a previous state, God can still act at a first instant of metaphysical time to originate the series of universe-states. Second, no answer to the question needs to be given, for as we've seen, the motion of a tennis ball, and all motion in general, lacks a first instant and yet has an external cause. I'm content to say that God creates the universe in the same way that motion is caused to occur. Explaining exactly <i>what</i> that means and how that is to be worked out isn't needed in order to see that it's possible, and that's enough to see that Mitchell's entailment argument for atheism isn't a good one.</span></span><br />
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">William Vallicella makes some helpful comments:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“Somehow the external cause has to
'hook onto' the rolling-ball process. How? The last instantaneous state of the
pushing cannot hook onto the first state of the rolling-ball process, for there
is no first state. This suggests that the last state of the pushing connects to
an entire causal sequence, namely the sequence of rolling-ball states. Thus a
whole sequence would somehow be the effect of a cause. If so, the sequence or
succession would not be logically supervenient upon its members, an
'ontological free lunch,' but something in addition to its members….If something
like this could be worked out in detail -clearly not a task for the present occasion!-then
the way would be clear for the theist to argue that the entire universe is a sequence
of states that is the effect of a cause.” [12]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">V. Implications of Cosmological Atheology<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitchell outlines two implications of the entailment argument
that would still stand, were it shown to have premises with possible
exceptions. First, Mitchell claims that the <i>kalam </i>cosmological argument for the
existence of God would still be undermined. I’ll save my response to this point
for when Mitchell and I discuss the<i> kalam</i> cosmological
argument, and this will be happening shortly. </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Second, Mitchell contends that the entailment argument
for atheism would still be a probabilistic argument for atheism. There are three problems here. First, I really don't understand how, in Paul Draper's words,
"...Smith showed in 'A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe,' not just that a self-caused universe is possible, but also that its
actuality is supported by our best scientific cosmology." [15] If what I've
said it sound, and if what Draper himself said previously in the article is
sound, then Quentin Smith, and by extension Mitchell, did not show that the
universe being self-caused is supported by our best scientific evidence. My
arguments above dismantle such a conclusion, at least in my estimation. Second, I'm skeptical of any claims about what God <i>would</i> do if He existed. How in the world can we know such fantastical things as what the omnipotent, omniscient God would do in some situation? More specifically, how could we know that it's </span><span style="line-height: 18px;">improbable</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"> that God would create a universe like this one? Third, and most importantly, the second implication of the
entailment argument concerns Quentin Smith’s entailment argument for a
self-caused universe, </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">not</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> Mitchell’s entailment argument for eliminating an
external cause of the universe. Mitchell has not shown that his argument still
works as a probabilistic argument for atheism, and I'm perfectly
justified in dismissing Paul Draper and Smith’s comments here, because
they don’t concern the argument Mitchell and I are discussing.</span></span><span style="font-size: small; line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">VI. Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">1. The fact that General Relativity is an incomplete theory
of nature undermines our warrant for thinking premise (1) is true, and Feynman’s
“sum-over-histories” approach to quantum gravity implies the falsehood of
premise (1).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">2. 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1 does represent the first
interval of time, though it will differ from context to context depending on
the unit of measure being used. 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 0.9 isn’t earlier
than 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1, but is merely a part of it. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">3. The three parody arguments I gave are parallel to Mitchell’s
entailment argument. They might not be parallel to Smith’s, but we’re not
discussing Smith’s argument. Because the parody arguments are unsound, Mitchell's entailment argument must be unsound.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">4. Mitchell has not shown that his argument is still a probabilistic
argument against God. Remember, we’re discussing Mitchell’s argument, not Smith’s.
As for the KCA, those comments will have to hold off until later.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Notes</span></span></b><br />
<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b>
<br />
<ol start="1" style="margin-top: 0in;" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitchell,
L. A., “A Defense of Cosmological Atheology”, Doubting Dave, (n.d.)
(September 8<sup>th</sup>, 2013) <<a href="http://doubtingdave.com/a-defense-of-cosmological-atheology/">http://doubtingdave.com/a-defense-of-cosmological-atheology/</a>></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Remember,
“<” means <i>earlier than</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Thus,
I’m giving what philosophers call an <i>undercutting defeater</i> of
premise (1). That is, I’m removing an warrant for thinking that its true.</span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Weinstein,
Steven and Rickles, Dean, "Quantum Gravity", <i>The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy </i>(Spring 2011 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http: archives="" entries="" plato.stanford.edu="" quantum-gravity="" spr2011="">.</http:></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Ibid.</span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Monton,
B., 2006, “Presentism and quantum gravity,” in D. Dieks, ed., <i>The
Ontology of Spacetime II</i>, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 263–280.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I take
it as given that in order for an argument to be a good one, each premise
of that argument must be shown to be more plausibly true than false.
Premise (1) of the entailment argument has not been shown to be more
plausibly true than false.<o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Because the parody argument based on Mitchell's life and the parody argument based on a segment of the history of the universe are very similar, I'll skip over discussion of the latter. But the reader will understand that remarks concerning the former also apply to the latter as well.</span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I
originally wrote the following three paragraphs here: <a href="http://www.debate.org/debates/The-Kalam-Cosmological-Argument-is-Sound/17/">http://www.debate.org/debates/The-Kalam-Cosmological-Argument-is-Sound/17/</a><o:p></o:p></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Donahue,
Miles. “General Relativity Proves What, You Say?: A Response to L. A.
Mitchell.” (n.d.): n. pag. <i>Science, Philosophy, and God</i>. Web.
9 October 2013.</span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Smith,
Quentin, and Paul Draper. “Collins on Cannons and Cosmology.” (n.d.): n.
pag. </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Internet Infidels Library</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. </span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Vallicella,
William. “Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist?” <i>Philosophy</i> 75
(2000), 609.</span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Smith,
Quentin, and Paul Draper. “Collins on Cannons and Cosmology.” (n.d.): n.
pag. </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Internet Infidels Library</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">. Web. 13 Oct. 2013. </span></span></li>
</ol>
</div>
Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-32476657025152596332013-09-29T10:25:00.000-07:002013-10-09T15:25:14.616-07:00A Defense of Cosmological Atheology<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By L.A. Mitchell</span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">I:
Introduction</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">”The
beginning is the end<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Keeps
coming round again”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">- How To
Destroy Angels, ”The Loop Closes”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I recently published an article called “General relativity
entails that the universe has no external cause”. It is necessary to read this
article in order to understand the arguments being made (a link will be
provided in the reference page for this purpose). [1] The Christian apologist
Miles Donahue has responded to this argument on his website [2], and I seek to
offer a defense of my ”cosmological atheology” in this paper.</span></span><br />
<a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">II: Quantum
Gravity Theories</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mr. Donahue objects to the idea that every state of time is
preceded by another state of time by appealing to certain quantum gravity
models. According to his references, there are “certain” quantum gravity models
which entail that you cannot speak of a state of time being preceded by an
infinite number of ever briefer states. While his objection seems erudite
and hard to tackle at first, it becomes apparent through his language that it
does not present a feasible to challenge to the first premise. I will explain
at length why this is the case.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">One must n</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">ote the highly speculative nature of this quantum
gravity model. A </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">certain</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> quantum gravity model contradicts the
first premise. </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">It might</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> be the case that </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">once</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> we
have a quantum theory of gravity, a first closed temporal interval of time will
reappear. Mr. Donahue does not even speak with probabilities when he discusses
this quantum gravity model. Instead, he speaks in terms of possibilities
and speculation rather than what is known presently. As a certain hero of Mr.
Donahue once said, "Possibilities come cheap!". [3]</span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mr. Donahue fails to name what this quantum gravity model
even is! If someone states that a model contradicts your premise, then it is
reasonable to expect them to name the model. Mr. Donahue fails to name it,
instead calling it a <i>certain</i> quantum gravity model. This
has two implications on his argument. One, it can not even be considered an
argument because there presently no way for me to address the evidence for it.
Imagine if, instead of talking about FRW models of the universe, I said
that a <i>certain</i> cosmological model refutes the existence of
god. No reasonable person should be expected to answer such an argument. I
consulted the William Lane Craig article and even the great man himself failed
to name it. Secondly, it leads to doubt about the validity of the model. If Mr.
Donahue will not even name the model, then this suggests that there is some
flaw which could be brought up if I knew what it was. We can therefore
reject Mr. Donahue’s objection to the first premise. However, rather than
presenting a negative response to his objection, I will actually go as far as
demonstrating the argument to be false.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">P1:
Quantum gravity models require the Minkowski interpretation of special
relativity.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">P2: The
Minkowski interpretation of special relativity is false.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">C:
Quantum gravity models are false.</span><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As a preliminary note, when my last paper mentioned
Einstein’s theory of general relativity, I really meant ”Neo-Newtonian
space-time”. I didn’t phrase my article in such a way because it is overly
technical, and the two theories are mathematically equivalent. [4]</span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The Minkowski interpretation of special relativity is an
interpretation of special relativity which denies an absolute frame of
reference. The Neo-Lorentzian interpretation, which both of us agree is the
best one, asserts the existence of an absolute frame of reference. Einstein’s
general relativity is based on the Minkowski interpretation of SR[5], while
Neo-Newtonian space-time is based on the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Quantum gravity is an attempt at using the principle of
quantum mechanics to understand the force of gravity. Mainstream quantum
gravity is based on Einstein’s general theory of relativity [6], which in turn
is based on the Minkowski interpretation of special relativity. This is why
using quantum gravity to cast doubt on my argument is actually contradictory
with the worldview of Mr. Donahue. We both agree that the best
interpretation of special relativity is the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation,
where there is an absolute frame of reference. However, quantum gravity entails
an interpretation of special relativity which denies an absolute frame of
reference. Mr. Donahue is therefore presenting a contradictory argument.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The second premise is supported by all of the evidence we
have in physics.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation is left-over
radiation from the Big Bang explosion. It is taken as one of the best pieces of
evidence that the Big Bang really happened[7]. The existence of the CMBR
confirms Lorentz’s idea that there is an ether. The book <i>Einstein, Relativity,
and Absolute Simultaneity</i> describes how the CMBR serves as an ether: ‘’The
cosmic microwave background radiation fills all of space and is remarkably
isotropic for any observer at rest with respect to the expansion of space. The
radiation background will be anisotropic for any observer in motion with
respect to an observer whose spatial coordinates remain fixed. It is therefore
a sort of ether, serving to distinguish physically a fundamental universal
reference frame.’’ As the theoretical physicist Lee Smolin writes in <i>Time
Reborn</i>, ‘’Another way to fix a preferred family of observers is to use the
cosmic microwave background. These preferred observers see the CMBR coming at
them at the same temperature from all directions in the sky.’’[8] It should be remembered
that this is not merely theoretical, but the motion of bodies has actually been
measured relative to the CMBR. The following experiment is mentioned in
<i>Einstein, Relativity, and Absolute Simultaneity</i>: ‘‘’Smoot, Gorenstein, and
Muller discovered that the Earth is moving relative to the radiation background
with a velocity of 390+60 km/sec in the direction of the constellation Leo.
They comment, ‘’The cosine anisotropy is most readily interpreted as being due
to the motion of the Earth relative to the rest frame of the cosmic blackbody
radiation-what Peebles calls the ‘new aether drift’’’.’’’.[9]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Alain Aspect’s experiments with Bell’s Inequalities also
serve as experimental vindication of the NL interpretation. Alain Aspect’s
experiments with Bell’s inequalities demonstrate simultaneous causation with
spatially distant photons. The measurement of one photon causes the other
photon to instantaneously take on an anti-correlated spin [10]. A measurement
of particle A causes an instantaneous change at particle B, which requires
absolute simultaneity. The implications of this experiment on the Minkowski
interpretation are huge, and some physicists and philosophers of physics take
it as empirical falsification of the MI, and proof of the NL interpretation. As
the physicist S.J. Prokhovnki writes, ‘’The notion of non-local causality,
discussed by Bell, requires a criterion of absolute simultaneity which has some
absolute significance: it is seem that a cosmological basis for a universal
measure of cosmic time resolves this problem…’’[11]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;"><br /></span>
<span style="line-height: 115%;">It therefore follows that P2 is true. Since P1 is also true, the conclusion is true as well. Therefore, we have good reasons to reject any argument against the first premise based on quantum gravity.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">III:
Vallicella and Craig</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mr. Donahue has proposed that the first state of time can be
thought of as the interval 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1. Now, according
to the definition of a first state of time as presented by Donahue, this must
be the first interval of time. However, this cannot plausibly represent the
first interval of time. There is an earlier interval than this interval, which
is the interval 0 < t ≤ .9. This is an earlier interval
than 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1 because it does not contain states of
time which correspond to the real numbers between .9 and 1. Once can continue
the process of identifying an earlier interval for a potentially infinite
amount of times. Therefore, there is no first interval.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Even if his definition was valid, in what sense
could god cause this interval to exist? He cannot cause any part of it, as any
T that is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 1 will be sufficiently
caused by a previous T. He cannot cause the whole thing, as the whole thing is
instantiated by the fact that every T is sufficiently caused by a previous T.
Mr. Donahue captures my reasoning spot-on when he writes
(rhetorically) ”if the first temporal interval of the universe of the
universe is half-open, then every state of the universe is caused by a previous
state, so where, so to speak, does God cause the universe to come into being?
Which state of the universe does God cause?”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mr. Donahue would answer that ”there are parallel cases
of things coming into being in half-open intervals of time, and yet having
external causes”, which is an argument based on statements from William
Vallicella and Craig. I will respond to each of their arguments individually.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">William Vallicella’s argument, contrary to his assertion that
his parody is parallel with Smith’s, is not the same. According to Vallicella,
we can delete the first instant of my life, such as my birth, and my life would
be a continuum of half-open states of time. However, it’s obvious that my birth
had an external cause, so the fact that something is a continuum of half-open
states of time does not mean it has an external cause. The argument fails as a
parody by an analysis of the first instant of time and the first instant of my
birth. In my previous paper, I gave arguments against the physical ontology of
the Big Bang singularity. Its attributes are self-contradictory, like the
attributes of having infinite temperature while also being a zero-dimensional
point. The singularity at T=0 is deleted because it is necessary to do so. The
deletion of the first instant of my birth is arbitrary and there are no reasons
to do so. The key difference between the two deletions is that a first instant
of the universe is physically impossible, while a first instant of my birth is
physically possible. Vallicella seems to think that the argument reasons that
since there is a continuum of half-open states, there cannot be an external
cause. Rather, the reasoning is that a first instant is physically impossible,
ergo there is a continuum of half-open states, ergo there is no external cause.
Vallicella’s parody cannot be equal to Smith’s argument because it cannot
contain the false premise ”the first instant of my birth is physically
impossible”.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Quentin Smith takes this position in his article "A
Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe". [12] He writes
that,</span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">"Some philosophers have argued that if the first instant of the first
hour after the Big Bang can be 'deleted' (i.e., regarded as a nonexistent),
then the first instant of any hour can be deleted. This would allow one to say
that any hour or hour-long process has no external cause, since each of its
instantaneous states is caused by earlier instantaneous states that are
internal to the hour-long process. They say a cannon ball’s flying through the
air could then be 'causally explained' without referring to the relevant
external event, the explosion of the gun powder in the cannon, by saying that
each instantaneous state of the ball’s movement is caused by earlier
instantaneous states of its movement, implying that the external event, the gun
powder explosion, is not the cause of the ball’s movement. Their mistake is
failing to realize that the first hour after the Big Bang lacks a first instant
because of a unique circumstance, that there is a cosmic singularity. There is
no cosmic singularity at the present hour or at the various hours they mention
and Big Bang cosmology implies these hours or hour-long processes must have a
first instant. The first instantaneous state of the cannon’s ball movement is
externally caused by the explosion of the gunpowder.”</span></span></blockquote>
</div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Robin Collins, a professor of philosophy, wrote an article
called "Objections to Smith’s Cosmological Argument" [13] which states some of
the points Vallicella made about motion. Like Vallicella, Collins argues that
if every state of a cannon ball firing is caused by a previous state of the
cannon ball firing, then the gunpowder did not cause the cannon ball to fire.
However, it clearly did, so there is something wrong with Smith’s reasoning. I
will articulate the response made by Paul Draper and Quentin Smith in their
article “Collins on Cannons and Cosmology”. [14] . They argue that that
the PCE is better stated as "Once the existence of each of the parts (states)
of the universe has a <i>historically complete</i> explanation in
terms of (earlier) parts of the universe, the existence of the universe
is <i>completely</i> explained, since the existence of the universe
is a logical consequence of the existence of its parts." From this
correction, Smith is able to say that ”Since the flight of the cannonball does
not have a <i>historically complete</i> explanation in terms of earlier
parts of that flight, no sound parallel argument can be constructed for the
conclusion that the flight of the cannonball is completely explained by its
parts and their causal relations.” I think this is sufficient to answer
”Mitchell’s Life Entailment Argument”, “The Truncated Universe Entailment
Argument”, and “The Tennis Ball Entailment Argument”.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Vallicella also argues that "Hence each state’s being
caused by earlier states cannot be invoked to explain why the universe began to
exist." I am not sure as to why Mr. Donahue felt it was necessary to use this
quote. My argument is not that we can explain the universe by saying that each
state of the universe is caused by a previous state, although I think that’s
true. The argument only seeks to eliminate a certain type of cause from the
different causes that we can consider. There is no step in the argument which
requires the reasoning that "the universe began to exist because every state of
the universe is caused by a previous state".<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">There are arguments from Craig that motion would be
impossible if Smith’s argument is correct. [15] He objects to it on what you
could call a Zeno’s paradox of motion. I think these concerns can be solved
through invoking supertasks. Supertasks entail dividing finite intervals
of time into smaller states of time. I will present the most common way of
solving Zeno’s paradox through the use of supertasks: <i>The successive
distances covered by Achilles as he progressively reaches the mid points of the
spans he has left to go through form an infinite series 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16
+ … whose sum is 1. Consequently, Achilles will indeed reach point B (x = 1) at
t* = 1 P.M. (which is to be expected if he travels with velocity v = 1 km/h, as
has been assumed). Then there is no problem whatsoever in splitting up his run
into smaller sub-runs and, so, no inherent problem about the notion of
supertask</i>. [16]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">IV:
Implications of Cosmological Atheology</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">I wanted to devote a section to stating the implications of
my arguments on things oth</span><span style="line-height: 115%;">er than the existence of god. Indeed, it does much
more than demonstrate that god does not exist. I’ll simply quote from ”Collins
on Cannons and Cosmology” to make this point, as Draper and Smith worded it
very articulately. [17]</span></span></div>
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">”First, Big Bang cosmology undermines one major theistic
argument, namely, the kalam cosmological argument. This result is remarkable,
since most defenders of the kalam argument appeal to Big Bang cosmology for
support. According to the kalam argument, anything that begins to exist has a
cause other than itself of its existence; therefore, since the universe began
to exist, it follows that it has a cause other than itself of its existence.
Suppose on the one hand that 'begins to exist' means 'has a first moment of its
existence.' Then the second premise of this argument, the premise that the
universe began to exist, should be rejected. For as explained above, Big Bang
cosmology supports the view that the universe cannot exist at t0 and more
generally has no earliest moment. Suppose, on the other hand, that “begins to
exist” just means 'is finitely old.' Then the first premise of the argument
asserts that anything that is finitely old has a cause other than itself of its
existence. The argument in 'A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused
Universe' shows, however, that there is no good reason to believe that this
premise is true. A finitely old universe with no first moment can have a
complete explanation of its existence even if it has no 'external' cause.</span> </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Second, even if we cannot disprove God’s existence, we still
have a powerful probabilistic argument against it, indeed one having the same
logical structure as Collins’ design argument. For Smith showed in 'A
Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe,' not just that a self-caused
universe is possible, but also that its actuality is supported by our best
scientific cosmology. Surely theists should be surprised by this while
metaphysical naturalists, who deny the existence of supernatural causes, should
not. Granted, many naturalists believe that the existence of our universe is a 'brute fact' (that is, a fact having no explanation); but the only reason they
hold this belief is that they mistakenly think that a <i>naturalistic</i> explanation
of the universe is impossible. Therefore, relying on Collins’ 'likelihood
principle,' we can draw the following conclusion: the fact that our best
scientific theory of the origin and evolution of the universe supports the
claim that the universe is self-caused is antecedently much more likely given
naturalism than it is given theism and so is very strong evidence supporting
naturalism over theism.”</span></span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">V:
Conclusion</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">1: Appeals to QG models from Mr. Donahue are speculative and
weak. Besides this issue, Mr. Donahue fails to state what QG model he’s even
talking about. It is also the case that appealing to QG models contradicts Mr.
Donahue’s belief in the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">2: 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1 cannot represent
the earliest interval of time.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">3: William Vallicella’s parody is not parallel with
Smith’s.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">4: My argument still offers a refutation of the KCA and
a probabilistic argument against the existence of god.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">References</span></b></span><br />
<ol><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px; text-align: left;">
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitchell, L.A. “General Relativity Entails That the Universe Has No External Cause.” (n.d.): n. pag. </span><i>Doubting Dave</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Web. 29 Sept. 2013. </span><http: doubtingdave.com="" general-relativity-entails-that-the-universe-has-no-external-cause="">. </http:></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Donahue, Miles. “General Relativity Proves What, You Say?: A Response to L. A. Mitchell.” (n.d.): n. pag. </span><i>Science, Philosophy, and God</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Web. 29 Sept. 2013. </span><http: general-relativity-proves-what-you-say_6942.html="" sciencephilosophyandgod.blogspot.com="">. </http:></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Lane Craig, William. “Our Grasp of Objective Moral Values.” </span><i>ReasonableFaith.org</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. ReasonableFaith, n.d. Web. 29 Sept. 2013. </span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">"</span><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But possibilities come cheap."</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Dainton, Barry. </span><i>Time and Space</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Evans, M.W., and H. Eckardt. “The Development Of General Relativity With The Minkowski Metric.” </span><i>Alpha Institute for Advanced Studies</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 28 Sept. 2013. </span><http: a203rdpaper.pdf="" aias.us="" documents="" uft="">. </http:></li>
<li>“Quantum Gravity –The Missing Link to Understanding the Evolution of the Universe.” N.p., n.d. Web. </li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Krauss, Lawrence M. “Light from the Beginning of Time.” </span><i>A Universe From Nothing</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. N.p.: Atria, 2012. 42. Print. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Smolin, Lee. “Time Reborn from Relativity.” </span><i>Time Reborn</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013. 166. Print. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Smith, Quentin, and William Lane Craig. “Metaphysics of Special Relativity.” </span><i>Einstein, Relativity, and Absolute Simultaneity</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. New York: Routledge, 2007. 29. Print. ,</span></li>
<li>The Fabric of the Cosmos, pgs 112-115</li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Smith, Quentin, and William Lane Craig. “Metaphysics of Special Relativity.” </span><i>Einstein, Relativity, and Absolute Simultaneity</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. New York: Routledge, 2007. 33. Print. ,</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Smith, Quentin. “A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe.” (n.d.): n. pag. </span><i>Internet Infidels</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Web. 29 Sept. 2013. </span><http: library="" modern="" quentin_smith="" self-caused.html="" www.infidels.org="">.</http:></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Collins, Robin. “Objections to Smith’s Cosmological Argument.” (2008): n. pag. </span><i>Internet Infidels Library</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Web. 28 Sept. 2013. </span><http: library="" modern="" not-self-caused.html="" robin_collins="" www.infidels.org="">.</http:></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Smith, Quentin, and Paul Draper. “Collins on Cannons and Cosmology.” (n.d.): n. pag. </span><i>Internet Infidels Library</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Web. 28 Sept. 2013. </span><http: cannons.html="" library="" modern="" paul_draper="" www.infidels.org="">. </http:></li>
<li>Craig, William Lane. “Science and Religion.” California Polytechnic State University. Veritas Forum, Pomona, CA. 2004. </li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Pérez, Laraudogoitia, Jon. “Supertasks.” </span><i>Stanford University</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Stanford University, 29 June 1999. Web. 29 Sept. 2013. </span><http: entries="" plato.stanford.edu="" spacetime-supertasks="">. </http:></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Smith, Quentin, and Paul Draper. “Collins on Cannons and Cosmology.” (n.d.): n. pag. </span><i>Internet Infidels Library</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">. Web. 28 Sept. 2013. </span><http: cannons.html="" library="" modern="" paul_draper="" www.infidels.org="">. </http:></li>
</span></ol>
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</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(Article originally published at: <a href="http://doubtingdave.com/a-defense-of-cosmological-atheology/" style="line-height: 115%; text-indent: -0.25in;">http://doubtingdave.com/a-defense-of-cosmological-atheology/</a>)</span></div>
Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-87848789506481350782013-09-28T18:12:00.000-07:002013-09-29T05:22:31.415-07:00General Relativity Proves What, You Say?: A Response to L. A. Mitchell<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By Miles
Donahue</span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I. Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mr. L. A. Mitchell has recently argued [1] that Einstein’s
theory of General Relativity proves that the universe has no external cause,
and by extension, that God does not exist. In my response, I will first define
key terms used in the argument, boil the argument down to its essentials and
address <i>what </i>Mitchell’s argument
actually proves, and finally, provide a substantial criticism of that argument.
I will not try to show that God exists or even formulate an argument for the
existence of God. Because Mitchell’s contention is that General Relativity
disproves the existence of God, he has the burden of proof to maintain that
contention; I have no contentions to defend.</span></span><br />
<a name='more'></a></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">II. Clarifications of Terminology<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">In section II of his article, Mitchell provides definitions for some key terms used in his argument. But it seems to me
that a reader new to the subject might not understand what he’s talking about,
so I’d like to provide some further clarifications. First, <b>a closed state of time</b> is an interval of time (that is, a non-zero,
finite period of time) which includes its endpoints (e.g., the interval of time
from and including 12:00pm to and including 1:00pm). Algebraically, a closed
state of time looks like this: 12:00pm ≤ <i>t</i>
≤1:00pm. Second, <b>a half-open state of time</b> is an interval of time which includes one
of its endpoints but not the other. For example, all times later than 12:00pm,
up to and including 1:00pm, is a half-open interval of time because it includes
one of its endpoints (1:00pm) but not that other (12:00pm). We could explicate
a half-open state of time algebraically like this: 12:00pm < <i>t</i> ≤ 1:00pm. Notice that while <i>t</i> includes 1:00pm, it does not include
12:00pm. Third, <b>a first state of time</b>
is simply the very first interval of time, whether a closed interval or a
half-open interval. This point needs to be underscored: a first state/interval
of time doesn’t need to be a closed state of time. We can still talk about the
first second of time, even if that second is open in the earlier than direction
(that is, there is no first instant bounding that second). So I simply disagree
with Mitchell’s definition of “first state of time.” Fourth, <b>an</b> <b>instant
</b>is a point in time of zero duration.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I think it’s clearer if we talk about half-open or closed <i>intervals</i> of time, rather than <i>states</i> of time. We can talk about states
of the universe (that is, a particular configuration of the universe at some point
in time), but the term “state of time” doesn’t have much meaning, because a
state of something is a configuration of that thing at a particular time, and
you can’t have a configuration of time itself at some time! So let’s stick with
“interval” rather than “state” when talking about time.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">III. Trimming the Entailment Argument<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First, I think we can trim the entailment argument down a
bit. Mitchell provides that following formulation of the entailment argument:</span></span></div>
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<ol>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by a
previous state.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by a
previous state, then every state of the universe has a causal explanation with
reference to another state.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If every state of the universe has a causal explanation with
reference to another state, then there is no state of the universe that was not
caused by a previous state of the universe.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">An external cause of the universe can only exist if there is
a state of the universe that was not caused by a previous state of the
universe.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Therefore, the universe has no external cause (by 3 and 4).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Therefore, God does not exist.</span></span></li>
</ol>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that the
argument is overly complicated. That is, it can still reach (5) with less
premises. Premises (2) and (3) superfluous because (5) follows from (1) and (4)
alone, and thus (2) and (3) really don’t need to be included in the argument.
The second thing that should be said is that (6) doesn’t follow from (1) – (5)
by any rule of logical inference. Rather, you need an additional premise to
show that God does not exist. Thus, I propose the following reworking of the
entailment argument:</span></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">1. Every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by a
previous state.</span></span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">2’. An external cause of the universe can only exist if there
is a state of the universe that was not sufficiently caused by a previous state
of the universe.</span></span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">3’. God, if He exists, is the external cause of the universe.</span></span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">4’. Therefore, the universe has no external cause (from 1 and 2’)</span></span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">5’. Therefore, God does not exist (from 3’ and 4’).</span></span></blockquote>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Notice that this form of the argument is logically valid, by
the rule of logical inference known as <i>modus
ponens</i>. Because an external cause of the universe requires there to be a
state of the universe which is not sufficiently caused by a previous state, and
every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by a previous state, there
cannot be an external cause of the universe. Because God by definition is the
external cause of the universe, He cannot exist. This reformulation makes the
logical structure of the argument much clearer.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">IV. What the Entailment Argument Actually Proves<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I’d like to address the significance of the entailment
argument. The theist could agree with the conditional statement, “<i>if</i> General Relativity is true, then
there cannot be an external cause of the universe”, but deny that the
“if-clause” is true. That is, they would argue that General Relativity does not
actually tell us about the nature of time. This is because General Relativity
is an incomplete theory of the world; it needs to be married to quantum
mechanics, and no one’s sure how that’s going to be done. It might be the case
that once we have a quantum theory of gravity, a first closed temporal interval
of time will reappear, and by extension a first state of the universe, and
premise (1) will be shown to be false. Indeed, this seems to be the case!
William Lane Craig outlines this point as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“A typical approach to marrying
quantum theory to General Relativity involves describing the evolution of
spacetime as a path integral (a sum over all possible paths) in superspace,
which is a space of points respresenting three-dimensional configurations of
the universe. The points of this configuration space can be regarded as
instantaneous states or even as instants, but the fact that in the quantum
theory one has a path integral, rather than a single path, makes it impossible
to “stack” these instants into a unique history constituting a spacetime. So eventually
the dividing process [of states of the universe caused by previous states]…becomes
ill-defined in the theory. The fact that the first split-second of the universe’s
existence as measured in cosmic time is not resolvable into a unique sequence
of ever briefer states is not inconsistent with there being a first second of
its existence.” [2]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">So on certain theories of quantum gravity, you don’t have a
nice splicing of the universe into every briefer intervals of time that
converge towards T=0 as a limit; there aren’t states of the universe which are
all causally explained as you go backward in time. At the very least, we just
don’t have enough information to conclude that premise (1) is true. But let
this second point pass. Is the argument, on its own terms, sound? I think not.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">V. Criticisms of the Entailment Argument<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Let’s turn to premise (1) – <i>every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by a previous state.</i><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First, the careful reader will notice that all of section IV
of Mitchell’s article argues that there cannot be a first closed interval of
time. But as I already pointed out, there’s no contradiction in asserting that
the first interval of time is <i>half-open</i>;
indeed, that seems to be what General Relativity implies! The first interval of
time can then be expressed as follows: 0 < <i>t</i> ≤ 1, and you can adopt any unit of measure you wish, whether
seconds, minutes, hours, etc. Of course, there is no first state of time in the
sense of a first instant of time, but that’s not how Mitchell or I define
“first state of time.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Second, we’ve been given no reason to accept premise (1). I
can’t garner a single line of evidence for (1) from Mitchell’s paper. All he’s
really argued for is that there can’t be a first closed state of time. He
hasn’t shown us how this fact implies the truth of (1). Therefore, he’s failed
to shoulder his burden of proof. I could stop here and be completely justified,
but I think we can be more charitable and reconstruct the argument Mitchell
means to give. The idea here is that if the first interval of the history of
the universe is half-open, then there are an infinite number of states of the
universe prior to any state one picks. The state of the universe at T=1 is
proceeded and caused by the state of the universe at T=0.5, which is caused by
the state of the universe at T=0.25, which is caused by the state of the
universe at T=0.125, <i>ad infinitum</i>. So
if the first interval of time in the history of the universe is half-open in
the earlier-than direction, then every state of the universe is sufficiently
caused by a previous state. Thus, there is no <i>first</i> state of the universe left unexplained. But as I said, this
reasoning was left out of Mitchell’s paper.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Let’s now turn to premise (2’) – <i>an external cause of the universe can only exist if there is a state of
the universe that was not caused by a previous state of the universe.</i> <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Here it’s even more obvious that Mitchell has failed to
shoulder his burden of proof. With regard to premise (2’), all Mitchell has to
say is, “The first premise is warranted, and I believe that the other premises
logically follow from its truth.” Well, I’m glad that Mitchell has such
confidence, but no theist will simply trust him when he says that (2’) is true.
He needs to provide some argument for its truth; it can’t simply be asserted or
assumed. But again, I will be charitable and try to reconstruct the
argument for (2’). The idea seems to be that in order for something to have an
external cause, there must be a first <i>instant</i>
of its existence; it must have a beginning <i>point</i>.
In other words, the first temporal interval of a caused thing’s history cannot
be half-open in the <i>earlier-than</i>
direction. As we’ve seen, if the first temporal interval of the universe of the
universe is half-open, then every state of the universe is caused by a previous
state, so where, so to speak, does God cause the universe to come into being? Which
state of the universe does God cause? We can agree that the universe began to
exist, but in a very real sense it would appear to be self-caused. Let me give
two responses to this argument:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First, there are parallel cases of things coming into being
in half-open intervals of time, and yet having external causes. Thus, we can
give a <i>reduction ad absurdum</i> of the
argument. Consider first Mitchell’s lifespan. Let’s say he began to exist at
T=5 and has lived ‘till T=10. It’s clear that his lifespan forms a closed
interval; in other words, T=5 is the instant at which he began to exist. [3]
But now consider Mitchell’s <i>truncated</i>
life; let us delete the instant T=5 from the temporal series. That is, consider
the half-open interval of time 5 < <i>t</i>
≤ 10. Because this interval is half-open, every instantaneous state of
Mitchell’s life is caused by a previous state. The state of Mitchell’s life at
T=10 is caused by the state at T=7.5, which is caused by the state at T=6.25, <i>ad infinitum</i>. Thus, there is no state of
Mitchell’s life in this interval lacking an explanation in terms of a previous
state, and there is no first state of Mitchell’s life. And yet, Mitchell’s life
during this interval was caused by his life in a previous interval. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Consider next the universe in the interval of time between
T=10 and T=20. Again, we shall delete the first instant from the interval [4],
forming the half-open interval of time 10 < t ≤ 20. The reasoning will be
the same as the above example. Every instantaneous state of the universe has an
explanation in terms of a previous state, there is no first state of the
universe in this interval, and thus there cannot be an external cause of the
universe in this period of time. And yet we know there is, namely the universe
as it was in a previous interval of time.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Consider finally the motion of a tennis ball. Let’s say a
tennis ball is in motion from 5:00 to 5:01. Next, let’s stipulate that 5:00 is
the last instant at which the ball is at rest. Of course, we could consider
5:00 to be the first instant at which the ball moves, but the first characterization
is more plausible. As William Vallicella explains:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“For one may reckon the moment of
the ball’s transition from rest to motion as the last moment of the ball’s
being at rest, which then entails, given the continuity of time, that there is
no first state of the ball’s being in motion. Arguably, we must view the matter
in this way: otherwise the ball would suddenly be moving at some positive
velocity without having accelerated to this velocity from velocity zero through
continuum-many instants.” [5]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Now if 5:00 is the last instant at which the ball is at rest,
it follows that there is no first instant at which the ball is in motion. This
is because instants cannot be immediately next to each other, so to speak,
because an instant is by definition a point in time of zero duration, and two
zeros is still just zero. But if there is no first instant at which the ball is
in motion, then the interval of time at which the ball moves (5:00 to 5:01) is
half-open. It then follows, as I’ve explained above, that every state of the
ball’s motion during this interval has an explanation in a previous state, and
thus it cannot have an external cause. And yet, it does; a tennis player hitting
the ball with his racket.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Again, William
Vallicella explains:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“And yet there is an external cause
of motion, [the person hitting the tennis ball]. Somehow the external cause has
to ‘hook onto’ the [moving]-ball process. How? The last instantaneous state of
the [hitting] cannot hook onto the first state of the [moving]-ball process,
for there is no first state. This suggests that the last state of the [hitting]
connects to an entire causal sequence, namely the sequence of [moving]-ball
states. Thus a whole sequence would somehow be the effect of a cause.” [6]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">William Lane Craig provides a helpful evaluation:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“One thinks in this connection of
the ancient sorites-style problems of starting and stopping…If there is a last
instant at which some object is at rest, then when does it begin to move? The
answer can only be that there is no first instant of its motion. Nonetheless,
the object does begin to move and plausibly requires a cause to set it in
motion. Similarly, if something begins to exist, it is plausible that it
requires a cause to bring it into being whether or not there is a first instant
at which it exists.” [7]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Notice that the above three arguments and the entailment
argument are parallel, so that if one of them is valid, the other three are
valid. But here’s the rub: if one is invalid, the other three are invalid as
well. Clearly, the “Mitchell’s Life Entailment Argument”, “The Truncated
Universe Entailment Argument”, and “The Tennis Ball Entailment Argument” are
all invalid, and thus the original entailment argument is invalid as well. Vallicella,
discussing a parody argument very similar to the “Mitchell’s Life Entailment
Argument” (except this time concerning Quentin Smith), says this:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“…if the original argument is
valid, the parody argument is also valid: after all, the two arguments have the
same form, and validity is a matter of form. And if the original argument is sound,
then so is the parody. The only difference between the two is in the first
premise of each. But it seems that the initial premises are either both true,
or else both false. If it is true that the universe is a continuum of
successive, instantaneous states, then it is also true that Smith’s life is a
continuum of such states. But it is as obvious as anything that the parody argument
is unsound, issuing as it does in a false conclusion: we know that the
beginning of Smith’s life has an external cause in the conjugal activities of
his parents, and since his life’s beginning has an external cause, it cannot
have an internal cause or causes on pain of causal over determination. I
conclude that the original argument is also unsound, which is to say that it is
either invalid in point of logical form, or possesses one or more false
premises, or both.” [8]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Second, we can show that the universe not only <i>could</i> have an external cause if its
earliest interval is half-open, but <i>needs</i>
an external cause [9], because the question, “Why did the universe begin to
exist?” is still left unanswered, even if the universe’s earliest interval is
half-open. Pointing out that each state of the universe is caused by a previous
state might show give an explanation as to why the universe <i>exists</i>, but not as to why the universe <i>began</i> to exist. Vallicella concludes by
saying:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">“Hence each state’s being caused by
earlier states cannot be invoked to explain why the universe began to exist.
The question, Why did the universe begin to exist? Cannot be answered by saying
that each state of the universe is caused by preceding states; for this could
be true even if the universe always existed.” [10]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If the universe were eternal, then every state of the
universe would have an explanation in terms of a previous state as well, so
merely showing that every state of the universe has an explanation in terms of
a previous state wouldn’t go one inch in explaining why the universe began to
exist, instead of existing eternally. Something outside or <i>external</i> to the universe is needed to answer that question.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">VI. Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">To conclude, I’ve shown that Mitchell’s argument is overly complicated,
and given a logically valid form of the entailment argument. I’ve shown that each
premise of that argument is problematic. With regard to (1), we’ve seen that Mitchell
has given no argument for its truth, and that on certain theories of quantum gravity,
the beginning of the universe cannot by “spliced up” into an infinite number of
states converging towards T=0. Concerning (2’), we’ve seen three parallel cases
of things coming into being lacking a first instant at which they came into
being, and yet having external cause. I’ve also shown that the question “Why
did the universe begin to exist?” cannot be answered by giving reference to the
various states of the universe. Thus, Mitchell’s entailment argument does not
show that the universe has no external cause or that God does not exist.</span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 18px;"><b><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Notes</span></b></span></div>
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<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Mitchell, L. A., </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Doubting
Dave</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">. 12 September 2013. Web. 28 September 2013. (</span><a href="http://doubtingdave.com/general-relativity-entails-that-the-universe-has-no-external-cause/" style="line-height: 115%;">http://doubtingdave.com/general-relativity-entails-that-the-universe-has-no-external-cause/</a><span style="line-height: 115%;">).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Craig, William Lane, "J. Howard Sobel on the Kalam
Cosmological Argument." </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Canadian Journal
of Philosophy </i><span style="line-height: 115%;">36 (2006). Note 34.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Alternatively, we could say that T=5 is that last instant at
which he does not exist, but a proponent of the entailment argument would not
except this understanding, for, as shall be shown, it would completely undermine
the entailment argument.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">In fact, no deleting is actually required, for as Mitchell
says, “every state of time on a FRW model is half-open.” So in the above
example, we are talking about the way intervals of time actually </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">are</i><span style="line-height: 115%;">.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Vallicella, William. “Could the Universe Cause Itself to
Exist?” </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Philosophy</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> 75 (2000), 609.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Ibid.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Craig, William Lane, "J. Howard Sobel on the Kalam
Cosmological Argument." </span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Canadian
Journal of Philosophy</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> 36 (2006).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">Vallicella, William. “Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist?”
</span><i style="line-height: 115%;">Philosophy</i><span style="line-height: 115%;"> 75 (2000), 607.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Operating under the assumption that whatever begins to exist
has a cause, of course.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Ibid, 608. </span></span></li>
</ol>
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Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-28788910062282617882013-09-19T17:07:00.000-07:002013-09-29T10:48:13.621-07:00General Relativity Entails that the Universe has No External Cause<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;">
<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By L.A.
Mitchell<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></span></div>
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<b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I:
Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The expansion of the universe, and thus the basis of the Big
Bang theory, is inferred based on equations derived from the theory of
relativity. The theist who uses Big Bang cosmology to argue for the existence
of god must accept these equations. Are these equations consistent with the
arguments used by theists? In this paper, I will demonstrate that Big Bang
cosmology actually contradicts the existence of god. Many of these arguments
will be based on my previous essay titled “God and Physics: Why general relativity
disproves god”. This paper will serve as a better argued and more concise
alternative to the last paper.</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">II:
Preliminary Definitions</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A half-open state of time can be thought of a line segment
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">A first state of time can be thought of as a line segment
with a maximum value and a minimum value.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV72JEzBFY6qBgxSfnRrx-YgBI7i0n0fQn41Jyy-b1Fs6hnQZye3m0kB0aymGEGBSeYrQ3G8Y1bKOPmfY_Zb1WnEq5wu5Ie4ualUaRdsHpI65rwU7kJolQmaoBDGP4t7l-s502ClzUFb4/s1600/closed.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><img border="0" height="83" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV72JEzBFY6qBgxSfnRrx-YgBI7i0n0fQn41Jyy-b1Fs6hnQZye3m0kB0aymGEGBSeYrQ3G8Y1bKOPmfY_Zb1WnEq5wu5Ie4ualUaRdsHpI65rwU7kJolQmaoBDGP4t7l-s502ClzUFb4/s400/closed.jpg" width="400" /></span></a></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">In the context of this argument, I use sufficient cause to
refer to a condition that, when it has been actualized, will inevitably lead to
something else. For example, if people are playing checkers, then there is also
a board and pieces in use. [1] The act of playing checkers requires the use of
a board and pieces.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">III:
Entailment Argument</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: 115%;">P1: Every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by a
previous state.</span><br /><span style="line-height: 115%;">P2: If every state of the universe is sufficiently caused by
a previous state, then every state of the universe has a causal explanation
with reference to another state.</span><br /><span style="line-height: 115%;">P3: If every state of the universe has a causal explanation
with reference to another state, then there is no state of the universe that
was not caused by a previous state of the universe.</span><br /><span style="line-height: 115%;">P4: An external cause of the universe can only exist if there
is a state of the universe that was not caused by a previous state of the
universe.</span><br /><span style="line-height: 115%;">C: By P3 and P4, The universe has no external cause.</span><br /><span style="line-height: 115%;">C2: God does not exist.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">IV: Support
for the entailment argument</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The theory of general relativity is one of the most supported
theories in science. The Hafele-Keating experiment demonstrates time dilation,
which is a prediction of general relativity. The orbit of Mercury is
experimental vindication of the theory of relativity’s equations. For many
centuries, it was noted that the orbit of Mercury was slightly different from
what Newton’s equations would predict. Instead of orbiting in a perfect ellipse
like other plants, the orbit of Mercury precesses (which means it does not
return to the same point after one orbit, but shifts slightly). When Einstein
calculated the orbit of Mercury using the equations of general relativity, it
predicted the orbit of Mercury with perfect accuracy. This is a strong
indication that the theory of relativity is true.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Physicists derive equations from relativity called metric
tensors (or metrics for short), which describe the geometric and causal
structure of space-time. Ever since Einstein created general relativity in
1915, four physicists have derived metrics from his theory that describe the
universe we live in, which are now called Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker
(FLRW) metrics. The FLRW metric describes a universe that is isotropic,
homogenous, and expanding. These metrics also state that every state of time is
half-open.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The reason why this is true is that FRW models of the
universe are singular. This means that it has an ideal point which is never
reached. According to FRW, there is no T=0 state. This is because there are no
space-time coordinates where T is equal to zero. Thus, every state of time on a
FRW model is half-open. [2]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If every state of time is half-open, then this creates
problems for a first state of time. A first state of time has a minimum value
and a maximum value. However, this contradicts the theory of relativity. The
theory of relativity tells us that every state of time must have no minimum
value, but a maximum value. Therefore, the theory of relativity tells us that a
first state of time does not exist. Not only that, but the existence of a first
state of time would actually be impossible! This diagram is useful for
imagining a FRW universe.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Every end-point (represented by the U shape) sufficiently
causes the next end-point, and is sufficiently caused by a prior end-point. If
one end-point represents the first hour after the Big Bang, and the next
end-point represents the second hour after the Big Bang, then the first hour
after the Big Bang sufficiently causes the second hour, because once it has
been actualized, it will lead to the second hour. The first premise is
warranted, and I believe that the other premises logically follow from its
truth.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">V: Big Bang
Cosmology</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The argument I give is consistent with standard Big Bang
cosmology. The universe still had a beginning in the sense that every state of
time must be less than 13.9 billion years old, the age of the universe. In
algebraic terms, if T represents a state of time, then every T < 13.9
billion years ago. I think this explanation will solve any questions about how
my view of the universe is compatible with standard Big Bang cosmology, which
has a finitely old universe. As the Catholic physicist E.A. Milne writes, ‘’the
Universe is meaningfully infinitely old because infinitely many things have
happened since the beginning”. [3]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Some may argue that the initial cosmological
singularity represents a beginning point. This is refuted by FRW models, which
state that the singularity is merely an ideal point. However, some arguments
can be made against a physical interpretation of the singularity. For example,
the philosopher of physics Quentin Smith has pointed out problems with this
interpretation. The singularity supposed to have infinite temperature, but it’s
a zero dimensional point. Temperature relates to molecules moving around, like
spreading out when heated, or getting closer together when cooled. How can
temperature make any sense at a zero-dimensional point, which by definition,
has no movement? [4] Dr. Craig also points out that a physical object with no
duration and no physical extension hardly qualifies as a physical thing at all.
[5]<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><b><span style="line-height: 115%;">VI:
Conclusion</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The theory of relativity contradicts the idea of a first
cause of the universe. There is no easy way for the theist to escape this
situation. One can deny the theory of relativity and a FRW model of the
universe, but this entails that Big Bang cosmology is false, and that it cannot
offer any support for the existence of god. The only plausible solutions are to
invoke a more complex idea of gods causal relation with the universe, which
will have problems being consistent with mainstream cosmology.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">“Causation and Correlation.” 9.2 </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Causality</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">. N.p., n.d. Web.
11 Sept. 2013.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Halvorson, Hans, Halvorson,. “Cosmology and Theology.”
</span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Stanford University</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">. Stanford University, 24 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Sept. 2013.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Milne, E. A., 1948. </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Kinematic Relativity</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">“Does God Exist?” </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">ReasonableFaith.org</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">. N.p., n.d. Web. 11
Sept. 2013.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Craig, William L., and Quentin P. Smith. </span><i style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">Theism, Atheism, and
Big Bang Cosmology</i><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 115%;">. N.p.: Clarendon Paperback, 1994. Print</span></li>
</ol>
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<span style="line-height: 115%;"><span style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">(Article originally published at: </span><a href="http://doubtingdave.com/general-relativity-entails-that-the-universe-has-no-external-cause/" style="font-family: "Helvetica Neue", Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: normal;">http://doubtingdave.com/general-relativity-entails-that-the-universe-has-no-external-cause/</a>)</span></div>
Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-159098218555958852.post-13790122620462870682013-09-19T16:40:00.000-07:002013-09-19T17:16:57.628-07:00Plan of Action<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">My friend and I have very different views on the world and, hopefully, this blog will get to the heart of that disagreement, as we discuss our differences and exchange criticisms. He is an atheist, I am I theist; I believe in God, he does not. I think we're both intelligent, rational individuals, and it's my hope that by discussing why we hold the views that we do, we can both learn something, and perhaps even change our own view. Our dialogue will basically take the form of an informal debate, more akin to how discussions take place in philosophy journals. For example, my friend will post an argument against the existence of God on his website (I will reproduce it here on this website), and then I'll write a response here. We'll go back and forth like this until one of us gets tired and wants to move on to another subject.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I think this experience will teach both of us, and perhaps you, many things about respecting those who think differently than you, and how to communicate and dialogue with others. Within the next few weeks, I will be writing a response to a recent article my friend has written giving an argument against the existence of God based on general relativity. I will reproduce the article here shortly.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Here we go!</span>Miles Donahuehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00017878333706957580noreply@blogger.com0